EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN ALASKA: THE

QUESTION OF PUBLIC POLICY TORTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Walt v. State1 and ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 2 the Alaska
Supreme Court recently fortified the contractual foundations of employment law. These cases reaffirmed the well-established notion that
a wrongful discharge gives rise to a breach of contract action and,
without more, will not support a common law tort claim. In Akers,
of
for example, the court held that a breach of the implied covenant
3
good faith and fair dealing sounds in contract rather than tort. Similarly, the court upheld the principle that, as with any breach of contract action, punitive damages are not recoverable for wrongful
4
discharge absent the commission of traditional independent torts.
As reaffirming as the holdings in these cases are, however, Walt
have posed some novel questions for Alaska employment
Akers
and
case has raised the question of whether Alaska should recEach
law.
in tort for wrongful discharges which violate public
an
action
ognize
policy. In recent years, the same question has been asked in every
jurisdiction and been debated among legal scholars.5 The issue is particularly controversial in the area of employment at will, where employees are seen as much more vulnerable to the possibility of
wrongful termination. To protect at-will employees from abuse, many
states have agreed to add "public policy" to the growing list of limitations placed on the employment-at-will doctrine. Other states, however, have refused to recognize the public policy tort on grounds that
it entails excessive judicial legislation and unnecessarily cramps managerial discretion. Still other states have attempted to strike a reasonable balance between these extremes by recognizing the public policy
doctrine only in limited situations. In Alaska, the issue has yet to be
resolved. In the Akers case, which dealt specifically with employment
but reat will, the court paid its respects to the public policy debate,
6
fused to either accept or reject the theory at that time.
Copyright © 1989 by Alaska Law Review
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2. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
3. Id. at 1154.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 70-114 and accompanying text.
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This note examines the recent limitations that have been placed
on the employment-at-will doctrine and specifically scrutinizes the
possibility of recognizing the public policy doctrine in Alaska. Section
II briefly recounts the history and traditional justifications behind employment at will. Section III discusses the modem limitations, both
legislative and judicial, that have been placed on an employer's right to
discharge at-will employees. This section includes a detailed discussion of the various types of public policy limitations and some of the
problems associated with the public policy doctrine generally. Section
IV focuses on the state of at-will employment in Alaska. The Walt
and Akers decisions are examined as the most recent pronouncements
on the proper place of tort claims in wrongful discharge suits. Section
V explores three alternative approaches to the public policy question
which, it is suggested, would avoid many problems associated with
recognizing the public policy limitation. Finally, Section VI concludes
that while there may be room for compromise, the Alaska Supreme
Court is unlikely to recognize the public policy doctrine as a significant limitation on employer discretion.
II.

THE HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

When the parties to an employment contract fail to specify the

term of employment, a void is created. That void, in order to facilitate
the resolution of employment disputes, begs to be filled by legal pre-

sumption. Where the parties are silent, the silence must be given
meaning, and the more uniform that meaning, the better. The law of
employment at will is the product of such legal presumptions.
The English common-law approach was typically mechanistic:

where no term of employment was specified, a one-year contract was
presumed. 7 If the employment relationship lasted beyond the first
year, it was presumed to be renewed for an additional year., The employee could be discharged only at the end of one of these yearly
terms. 9 Blackstone articulated the rule as follows:
7. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 425 (G. Tucker ed. 1803).
8. Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786, 787 (C.P. 1827). The court in Beeston
declared:
If a master hire a servant, without mention of time, that is a general
hiring for a year, and if the parties go on four, five or six years, a jury would
be warranted in presuming a contract for a year in the first instance, and so
for each succeeding year, as long as it should please the parties: such a contract being implied from the circumstances, and not expressed, a writing is
not necessary to authenticate it .... The contract is for a year at first, and if
the parties do not disagree, it goes on from one year to another.
9. Id. These presumptions were also codified in the Statute of Labourers, 23
Edw. III, ch. 1 (1349); Statute of Labourers, 5 Eliz. I, ch. 4 (1562).
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If the hiring be general without any particular time limited, the law
construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural
equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him,
throughout all the revolutions of the respective seasons, as well
when there is work to be done, as when there is not: but the contract may be made for any larger or smaller term. 10
Through the greater part of the nineteenth century, American
courts generally adopted the English approach, though the rule was
applied on a more ad hoc, case by case basis. 12 For example, in Bascom v. Shillito,13 the Ohio Supreme Court considered a wrongful discharge claim by Mr. Bascom, who was employed by the defendants for
$75 per month under a contract which did not specify the duration of
employment. Within several months of his hiring, Mr. Bascom was
given a raise to $1,100 per year, to begin on March 1, 1875. In July of
that year, Mr. Bascom was discharged. At trial, the lower court refused Bascom's request for instructions that would have allowed the
jury to fairly infer from the salary increase that employment was for
one year. Instead, the trial judge instructed the jury that if nothing
has been said as to duration of the contract, the employee may be
discharged "at the end of any month." 1 4 In reversing the lower court
ruling, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed the English "one-year presumption" but made a notable effort to establish that the facts of a
given case may displace the presumption:
The rule, that from the mere fact that a servant has been hired, the
law will presume an employment for a year, is by no means inflexible even in England, and perhaps a hiring for a shorter period will
be more readily inferred in this country than in England. There, as
well as here, proof of the periods at which payments were to be
made, the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, or other fact which may throw light upon
the question, is admissible. But in this case the [factual inferences]
were in harmony with the presumption, and we entertain no doubt5
that the plaintiff was entitled to [the requested jury instruction].'
10. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 425.
11. Mallor, Punitive Damagesfor Wrongful Discharge of At Will Employees, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 449, 453-54 (1985); Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at
Will - Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 208 (1982).
12. Crook, Employment At Will: The American Rule and its Application in
Alaska, 2 ALASKA L. REV. 23, 24 (1985).
13. 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882).
14. Id. at 433.
15. Id. at 433-34. See also Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143
(1891) (court extensively cites one-year presumption but relies instead on factual inferences to arrive at contract duration); Douglass v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 484,
23 N.E. 806 (1890) (despite existence of one-year presumption where duration of contract is not specified, by-laws of corporate defendant permitted discharge within a
shorter period); Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857) (adoption of one-year presumption where issue was when statute of limitations began to run).
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In the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, American
employment law began to diverge from the legal presumptions of England and develop its own theories of employment law. Specifically, the
American presumption was that where no term of employment is
mentioned, either party may terminate the employment relationship at
will. The employee was entitled to quit whenever he pleased and, similarly, the employer was permitted to discharge him for any reason
whatsoever. The presumption was designed to ensure the maximum
amount of freedom of each party to terminate a disadvantageous relationship and put its resources to more efficient use. Those parties who
felt exposed or at risk under such arrangements were perfectly free to
contract out of the presumption by specifying a definite term of
employment.
The origin of the American rule can be traced to a treatise on
master and servant law written by Horace Wood. 16 Wood posited the
new presumption as follows:
[A] general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if
the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon
him to establish it by proof .... [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is
determinable at the will of either party, and in this respect
there is
17
no distinction between domestic and other servants.
While the cases Wood cited in support of his rule 18 have been roundly
criticized as unhelpful and even irrelevant, 19 the American rule
quickly became entrenched in American jurisprudence. 20 It is likely
that the wide and rapid acceptance of the rule had more to do with
16. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at
272 n.4 (1877).
17. Id. at 272.
18. Wilder v. U.S., 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254
(1871); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106
Mass. 56 (1870). See H. WOOD, supra note 16, § 136, at 283 n.5.
19. Crook, supra note 12, at 25; Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118, 126 (1976); Summers, Individual Protection
Against UnjustDismissal. Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); Note,
Guidelinesfora Public Policy Exception to the Employment At- Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617, 618 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 163 F. 423 (E.D.N.Y. 1908);
Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889); Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co.,
17 Del. (1 Penne.) 581, 43 A. 609 (Del. Super. Ct. 1899); Harrod v. Wineman, 146
Iowa 718, 125 N.W. 812 (1910); Louisville & N. R. G. v. Harvey, 99 Ky. 157, 34 S.W.
1069 (1896); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887); Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756 (1904); Davis v. Pioneer Life
Ins. Co., 181 Mo. App. 353, 172 S.W. 67 (1914); Brookfield v. Drury College, 139 Mo.
App. 339, 123 S.W. 86 (1909); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42
N.E. 416 (1895); Christensen v. Pacific Coast Borax Co., 26 Or. 302, 38 P. 127 (1894)
(all at least recognizing the dominance of the American rule); Annotation, Durationof
Contract of Hiring Which Specified no Term, but Fixes Compensation at a Certain
Amount Per Day, Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1921). See also

1989]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN ALASKA

timing than with the logical progression of legal precedent. Indeed, it
is argued by many that at-will employment was primarily a convenient
by-product of American capitalism. 2 1 As the industrial revolution
gained momentum, popular economic and legal philosophy fell in line.
Laissez faire economics and the American rule of at-will employment
combined to protect the elbow room of managerial discretion. From
the industrialist's perspective, at-will employment made labor a much
more controllable resource. Not even effusive notions of "fairness"
prevented employers from discharging those who were no longer
worth the expense. A common formulation of the rule provided that
at-will employees could be discharged for good cause, no cause or even
22
"bad" cause.
For example, in a case in which a large railroad company
threatened to discharge any employee who purchased supplies at the
plaintiff's retail store, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause
or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty
of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may
exercise in the same way, to the23same extent, for the same cause or
want of cause as the employer.
Aside from its timely introduction, however, the American rule
was considered theoretically sound. At-will employment was a doctrine founded on freedom of contract principles. It was believed that
employers and employees should be allowed to structure their relationships as they choose, even if that choice meant risking security for
flexibility and freedom. 24 Moreover, it was commonly reasoned that if
Feinman, supra note 19, at 126; Mallor, supra note 11, at 454; Note, supra note 11, at
206; Note, supra note 19, at 618.
21. See,e.g., Crook, supra note 12, at 25; Feinman, supra note 19, at 131; Blades,
Employment At-Will v. IndividualFreedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
22. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Waters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915). The
Hutton court took issue with the Payne court on the proposition that an employer
could wield his right to discharge employees solely for the purpose of harming third
parties. The Hutton decision did not shake the foundations of employment at will.
Nevertheless, it was precisely this type of resistence to extreme applications of the
American rule that eventually took the shape of legal doctrines like the public policy
limitation. See infra notes 70-114 and accompanying text. Together Payne and Hutton present an almost philosophical debate, which continues today, on the appropriate
boundaries of employment at will. See Epstein, In Defense of the ContractAt-Will, 51
U. CHi. L.REV. 947, 948 (1984).
23. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 518-19.
24. Professor, now Judge, Richard Epstein is one of a dwindling number of scholars who continue to staunchly defend at-will employment on classic contract principles: "[T]he parties should be permitted as of right to adopt this form of contract if
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the employee had the right to quit at will, the contract lacked mutuality unless the employer had a corresponding right to discharge at will.
The English one-year presumption, it was argued, unfairly restricted
the freedom of the employer without imposing a similar hindrance on
25
the employee.
It was these theoretical underpinnings which, if only for a short
time, endeared the American rule to the United States Supreme Court
and gave at-will employment a constitutional legitimacy. In Adair v.
United States,2 6 the Court invalidated a federal statute which prevented discharges of railway employees on the basis of union affiliation. The Court grounded its ruling in the fifth amendment's
guarantees of due process and freedom of contract principles. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion stated:
[I]t is not within the functions of government... to compel any
person in the course of his business and against his will ... to per-

form personal services for another. The right of a person to sell his
labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the
same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering
to sell it. So the right of the employe' [sic] to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever
reason, to dispense with the services of such
27
employe' [sic].

The Court therefore ruled that the employer and the employee had
reciprocal rights to terminate the contractual relationship over the
union membership issue. 28 Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court several years later invalidated a Kansas statute which purported
to outlaw so-called "yellow-dog" contracts. 29 These agreements conditioned employment on the employee's promise that he would not
they so desire. The principle behind this conclusion is that freedom of contract tends
both to advance individual autonomy and to promote the efficient operation of the
labor markets." Epstein, supra note 22, at 951.
25. Many scholars have disputed that mutuality is a problem. Professor Blades,
for example, writes:
From the contractual principle of mutuality of obligation, it has been reasoned that if the employee can quit his job at will, then so, too, must the
employer have the right to terminate the relationship for any or no reason
.... But... mutuality is a high-sounding phrase of little use as an analytical tool. If the employee in addition to his services has given other "good"
consideration, such as foregoing a claim against the employer or giving up a
business to accept the employment, the agreement will be enforced on behalf
of the employee even though he is free to quit at any time. Thus it seems
clear that mutuality of obligation is not an inexorable requirement ....
Blades, supra note 21, at 1419 (footnotes omitted).

26. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
27. Id. at 174-75.
28. Id. at 175.
29. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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join a union. This time relying on the fourteenth amendment, the
Court held:
To ask a man to agree, in advance, to refrain from affiliation with
the union while retaining a certain position of employment, is not to
ask him to give up any part of his constitutional freedom. He is free
to decline the employment on those terms, just as the employer may
decline to offer
employment on any other; for "It takes two to make
'30
a bargain."
The American rule thus benefitted significantly from the legal and
economic climate in which it was conceived. That climate, of course,
would change considerably with the Great Depression and the ensuing
New Deal. Social welfare legislation and judicial activism were destined to narrow the wide berth that had traditionally been given freedom of contract. The freedom that employers enjoyed in at-will
relationships increased the pressures for legislative protection of organized labor. The labor movement, in turn, began the gradual process of limiting and qualifying the scope of the American rule.
III. JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The first substantive modifications of the American rule began in
the 1930s with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act and its
subsequent amendments. 3 1 The Act made it an unfair labor practice
for any employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. '' 32 With this abrupt departure from the principled stance of the Lochner 33 era, government regulation of private employment gained momentum, and a
enactments significantly limited an employer's
host of congressional
34
right to discharge.
30. Id. at 21.

31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1970 & Supp. 1989).
32. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1975).
33. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the Supreme Court
invalidated a New York law which purported to regulate the working hours of bakers.
The opinion was couched in constitutional terms of safeguarding individual freedom
to contract from governmental intrusion. The Lochner decision has come to typify an
era of American jurisprudence in which "liberty to contract" was given heightened
constitutional protection.
34. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a)
(1982) (protecting from discharge those who have wages garnished); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1975) (prohibiting the discharge of employees who
file complaints against the employer for violations of the Act); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) (prohibiting discharge or other
discrimination on the basis of age); Occupational Health and Safety Act § 11(c), 29
U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982) (prohibiting discharge of employees who file complaints in exercise of their rights to a safe working environment and other rights conferred under
the Act); Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982 & Supp. 11988) (protecting
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By the early 1970s, the court system, which had for so long refused to disturb the laissez faire nature of at-will employment, began
to follow the congressional lead. This judicial intervention was encouraged by a torrent of academic criticism decrying the American
rule as antiquated, unfair and philosophically pass6. 35 Though the
criticisms varied, most of the commentators emphasized the changing
face of the modem employment relationship. It was argued that the
employment scene which had nurtured the American rule in the nineteenth century had an intimate, personal flavor that had long since
disappeared. Employment, it was urged, had become less of a transaction between individuals and more of a commodity to be sold by powerful corporate entities and purchased by individual laborers. The

worker no longer had the bargaining power to "sell" his labor on his
own terms, and thus used it to "purchase" employment on terms that
were rarely subject to negotiation. By casting American economic
growth in this light, the critics of the American rule have shaded modem private employment with the same overtones of paternalism that
have spearheaded both the organized labor 36 and the consumer protection movements. 37 Grudgingly at first, then with increasing fervor,
courts have responded to this scholarly criticism of the American rule
through piecemeal regulation.
Judicial regulation of at-will employment has taken three major
approaches. First, some courts have found implied contractual
promises that the employee was hired for a definite duration or would
be discharged only for good cause. A second approach has been to
the employment rights of the physically handicapped); Employment Retirement Income Security Act § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1976) (prohibiting retaliatory discharge of
those who notify officials of violations of the Act); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a),
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1989) (Title VII) (prohibiting discharge on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1981)
(protecting union activity).
35. See Blades, supra note 21; Blumberg, CorporateResponsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A PreliminaryInquiry, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
279 (197 1); Blumrosen, Employment Discipline: UnitedStates Report, 18 RUTGERS L.
REV. 428 (1964); Feinman, supra note 19; Peck, UnjustDischargesfrom Employment.
A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979).
36. It is difficult to overemphasize the effect organized labor has had on at-will
employment. As unionized workers have become increasingly secure, at-will employees have become increasingly vulnerable by comparison. In reaction to this disparity,
courts and commentators have searched for a philosophy by which at-will employees
may benefit from the same rising tide of security enjoyed by unionized labor. One of
the most popular theories has been to give the at-will employee a property right in his
employment which cannot be arbitrarily deprived. See Peck, supra note 35. Despite
the obvious limitations of this and similar theories, the overall effect of the labor
movement has been to mutate the at-will philosophy in such a way as to keep the
nonunionized employee in step with the times. See Note, supra note 19, at 621.
37. See Blades, supra note 21, at 1420; Note, supra note 19, at 620-21.
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imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every at-will employment contract. The final, and most controversial, type of regulation has been to permit tort actions by employees discharged in
violation of public policy.
A.

Implied Contract

One judicial limitation on employment at will is the implied-infact contract. In resolving wrongful discharge claims, approximately
twenty-five jurisdictions 38 scrutinize the employment relationship for
express or implied assurances of job security and limit the employer's
discretion to discharge accordingly. These assurances are of two general types: (1) that the employee has been hired for a definite tenure or
(2) that the employee cannot be discharged except for good cause.
38. Mursch v. Van Dorn Co., 627 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd, 851
F.2d 990 (1987) (applying Wisconsin law); Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc.,
623 F. Supp 409 (W.D. Va. 1985); Brooks v. Trans World Airlines, 574 F. Supp 805
(D. Colo. 1983) (applying Colorado law); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F.
Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (applying Illinois law); Wagner v. Sperry Univac, 458 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd, 624 F.2d 1092 (1980) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 727 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing the principle but
holding against employee on particular facts); Leikvold v. Valley View Community
Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d 170 (1984); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn.
Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1980); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d 330 (Del. 1973);
Washington Welfare Assoc. v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 613 (D.C. 1985); but see Heideck v.
Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982). See Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health Center, 9 Kan. App. 2d 659, 684 P.2d 1031 (Ct. App. 1984); Shah v.
American Synthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Staggs v. Blue Cross,
61 Md. App. 381, 486 A.2d 798 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985); Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986); Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d
1015 (1984); Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677, 340 N.W.2d 388
(1983); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 666 P.2d 261 (1983); Wooley v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Vigil v. Arzola, 101
N.M. 687, 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441 (1982); Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.
1984); Helle v. Landmark, Inc., 15 Ohio App. 3d 1, 472 N.E.2d 765 (1984); Langdon
v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Domingo v. Copeland Lumber
Yards, 81 Or. App. 52, 724 P.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1986); Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332
N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Hamby v. Genesco, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1982); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063 (Utah 1981); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Mobil Coal
Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985). See also Note, Employment-AtWill: Defining the Parameters, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 377, 380 (1986).
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Such implicit contractual promises have typically been found in personnel manuals, employee handbooks 39 and even oral statements 40 by
the employer at the time of hiring. For example, in Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield,4 1 the defendant employer had stated to the plain42
tiff that he would be with the company as long as he did his job.
After being fired five years later for no apparent reason, the plaintiff
sued for wrongful discharge. The defendant argued that employment
contracts for an indefinite term may be terminated at will by either
party and for any reason. In holding for the plaintiff, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated:
We see no reason why an employment contract which does not have
a definite term . .. cannot legally provide job security. When a
prospective employee inquires about job security and the employer
agrees that the employee shall be employed as long as he does the
job, a fair construction is that the employer has agreed to give up
his right to discharge at will without assigning cause and may discharge only for [good or just] cause. The result is that the employee, if discharged without good
or just cause, may maintain an
43
action for wrongful discharge.
The implied contract approach represents the least intrusive limitation on at-will employment for two reasons. First, when courts allow recovery on this theory, they essentially rule that a true at-will
relationship never existed and that the contract is not as it appears.
The implied contract doctrine does nothing more than protect the parties' manifest expectations. Insofar as these expectations are influenced by oral or written assurances, courts do not substantially deviate
from basic contract principles by incorporating those assurances into
the employment agreement. Thus, to rule that there is more to a contract than meets the eye does not significantly alter the employmentat-will doctrine, which has always operated in the shadow of the law
of contracts. 44
39. See, e.g., Osterkamp v. Alkota Mfg., 332 N.W.2d 275 (S.D. 1983).
40. See, e.g., Larson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 427 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1988).
41. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
42. Id. at 597, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
43. Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
44. The California Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the notion that finding
implied-in-fact contracts, at least theoretically, does not erode the American rule:
The presumption that an employment relationship of indefinite duration is
intended to be terminable at will is... "subject, like any presumption, to
contrary evidence. This may take the form of an agreement, express or implied, that ... the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer's dissatisfaction with
the employee's services or the existence of some 'cause' for termination .... "
Permitting proof of and reliance on implied-in-fact contract terms does not
nullify the at-will rule, it merely treats such contracts in a manner in keeping
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Second, to the extent that the implied contract approach threatens to undermine the expectations of at-will employers, it is a threat
which can be easily avoided. Personnel manuals and employee handbooks can be revised to eliminate any hidden or unintentional assurances that employees will be discharged only for good cause. Hiring
managers can be instructed to guard against casual comments which
may later be construed as contractual promises. Finally, employers
can minimize the threat by including specific language in the contract
declaring that employment and discharge is at will. In Toussaint,4 5 for
example, the court insisted that its ruling does not leave employers
vulnerable. The court reasoned that "[w]here the employer has not
agreed to job security, it can protect itself by entering into a written
contract which explicitly provides that the employee serves at the pleasure or at the will of the employer or as long as his services are satis46
factory to the employer."
B.

Implied Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

A much more substantial modification of the American rule has
come with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
theory holds that every employment contract, even at will, contains an
implied covenant that the employer will deal with each employee
fairly and will discharge an employee only on a good faith belief that
the discharge is warranted. The modern implied covenant has largely
developed within the commercial law context where legislative bodies
have imposed duties on parties to deal fairly and in good faith in all
commercial transactions. 47 In employment law, however, the implied
covenant of fair dealing can be traced to the employee commission
cases of the 1940s. 48 These cases imposed liability on employers where
with general contract law ....

We see no sound reason to exempt the em-

ployment relationship from the ordinary rules of contract interpretation

which permit proof of implied terms.
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 681, 765 P.2d 373, 387, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 225-26 (1988) (citing Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,
324-25, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 923-25 (Ct. App. 1981)).
45. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
46. Id. at 613 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891 n.24. See also Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
47. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989) ("Every contract or duty within this act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement."); Crook, supra note 12, at

33.
48. See, e.g., Kollman v. McGregor, 240 Iowa 1331, 39 N.W.2d 302 (1949), cited
in Daughtrey, Another Exception Under the Employment At- Will Doctrine: Bowman
v. State Bank, 24 AM. Bus. L.J. 243, 250 (1986). Other scholars, however, trace the
doctrine to the duties of good faith and fair dealing imposed by the courts on insur-

ance companies in the 1960s. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 689-93, 765 P.2d at 393-96, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 231-34; Mallor, supra note 11, at 468; Note, Defining Public Policy Torts
in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 161 (1981).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:269

the sole motive for the discharge was to escape having to pay employee
commissions or bonuses. While many of these cases involved undeniable at-will contracts, courts nevertheless justified their rulings on gen-

eral grounds of fairness. Today, in those few jurisdictions which

recognize this implied covenant in the employment context, 4 9 an employee who believes he has been discharged in "bad faith" may maintain a cause of action for breach of contract. Typical applications of
the implied covenant theory are found in suits by employees who were
discharged for apparently no reason after many years of flawless performance50 and in cases involving discharges designed to avoid pay-

ment of commissions, bonuses or other benefits. 51
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.52 the Supreme Judicial

Court of Massachusetts restricted an at-will employer's absolute right
to discharge by implying a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
49. See, e.g.. Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying New Jersey law and recognizing that a covenant may be implied where
necessary to enable one party to receive the benefits promised for performance); Randolph v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1975) (applying
Ohio law); Rees v. Bank Bldg. and Equip. Corp., 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir. 1964), cerl.
denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964) (applying Missouri law); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d
1000 (Alaska 1983); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988) (but limiting recovery for breach of implied covenant to
contract damages); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492
(Super. Ct. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E. 2d
1251 (1977) (modified by Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 429
N.E.2d 21 (1981) (termination in the absence of good cause does not establish bad
faith and is only a factor in determining whether there was a fair dealing)); Gates v.
Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
113 N.H. 139, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (significantly limited by Howard v. Dorr Woolen
Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121
N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981)); Hall v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla.
1985). See also de Treville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099 (4th Cir. 1971)
(applying South Carolina law); Peterson v. First Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n of P.R.,
617 F. Supp. 1039 (D.V.I. 1985).
Several jurisdictions have explicitly rejected the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. See, e.g., Minihan v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 812 F.2d 726
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986);
Frichter v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 252 (D. Md. 1986);
Salazar v. Furr's Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1403 (D.N.M. 1986); Hostettler v. Pioneer HiBred Int'l, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Pittman v. Larson Distrib. Co.,
724 P.2d 1379 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986); Morris v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan.
1987); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206 (N.D. 1981); Hunt v.
IBM Mid America Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986);
Jeffiers v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp., 387 N.W.2d 692 (Neb. 1986).
50. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917 (Ct. App. 1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Ill Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
51. See, e.g., Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
52. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).

1989]

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN ALASKA

the company's employment contracts. The plaintiff was a salesman
who brought suit to recover unpaid commissions. He alleged that the
employer had fired him to avoid paying the commissions due. Relying
heavily on the covenant as it commonly operates in the commercial
law field, 53 the court held that "NCR's written contract contains an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a termination not
made in good faith constitutes a breach of contract .... [W]e believe
that where, as here, commissions are to be paid for work performed by
the employee, the employer's decision to terminate its at-will employee
should be made in good faith."'5 4 While the court refused to speculate
Whether every employment contract contained this covenant, 5 5 its reliance on such widely adopted commercial law principles clearly points
56
in that direction.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does give employees greater security from discharge. Nevertheless, this security
does not come without substantial drawbacks for both employers and
employees. Unlike the implied contract theory, the implied covenant
cuts straight to the heart of the at-will employment relationship and
substantially limits what has traditionally been a matter of employer
discretion. While the covenant in no way limits the employee's right
to quit at any time or for any reason, it does limit the employer's right
57
to discharge.
In fact, some jurisdictions which recognize the theory have been
especially mindful that the implied covenant works against the employer. In Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 58 the Superior Court
of Connecticut was faced with a plaintiff who had been employed by
the defendant for thirteen years under an oral contract of unlimited
53. Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256 (the court cited U.C.C. § 1-203).
54. Id. at 101-02, 364 N.E.2d at 1255-56.
55. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The Alaska Supreme Court has made the very
leap that Massachusetts avoided in Fortune. In Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000
(Alaska 1983), the court held that the discharge of an employee to avoid paying commissions was a violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and constituted a
breach of contract. The court has subsequently interpreted the decision in Mitford as
extending the implied covenant to all at-will employment contracts. ARCO Alaska,
Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988). Both Mitford and Akers are discussed in detail infra notes 141-50 and 184-201 and accompanying text.
56. Note, Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critiqueof the JudicialRole, 68
IOWA L. REv. 787 (1983). But see Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659,
429 N.E.2d 21 (1981).
57. For this reason, several courts have refused to recognize the implied covenant
limitation. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct.
App. 1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982);
Murphy v. American Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
58. 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1980).
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duration. The plaintiff was discharged after refusing to sign an admission of theft. Though ultimately denying the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the court restricted the scope of the implied covenant in an effort to protect employer discretion, stating:
The application of this doctrine must... be balanced with the right
of an employer to serve his own legitimate business interests. Accordingly, not every discharge made without cause constitutes a
breach of the implied covenant .... [T]o constitute a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith, the conduct of the employer
must
59
constitute an aspect of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Limiting an employer's right to discharge may not be unreasonably onerous if employers have a clear and predictable standard by
which to gauge future conduct. Clarity and predictability will at least
allow employers to avoid wrongful discharge suits by conforming their
behavior to the standard. However, the good faith and fair dealing
standard is neither clear nor predictable. 60 The standard not only calls
for a highly subjective analysis that defies generalization, but also is so
laden with amorphous connotations of "fair play" that it becomes
dangerously confused with a "good cause" requirement. 6 1 In Cleary v.
American Airlines,62 for example, the California Court of Appeal held
the defendant employer liable for breaching the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The plaintiff was discharged without
59. Id. at 4.1, 429 A.2d at 494 (quoting A. John Cohen Ins. Co. v. Middlesex Ins,
Co., 392 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)).
60. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (Ct. App.
1980); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Murphy
v. American Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983); Madison, The Employee's
EmergingRights to Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair Discharge,6 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 422,
432 (1981).
It was partly for this reason that the California Supreme Court recently refused
to allow tort damages for breach of the implied covenant which that state has long
recognized. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 695-97, 765 P.2d 373,
398-99, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 236-37 (1988), the court stated:
Initially, predictability of the consequences of actions related to employment
contracts is important to commercial stability. In order to achieve such stability, it is also important that employers not be unduly deprived of discretion to dismiss an employee by the fear that doing so will give rise to
potential tort recovery in every case.
Id.
61. The two concepts are vastly different. The good faith standard does not require that a discharge be supported by valid reasons; the only requirement is an absence of bad faith. In sharp contrast, the just cause standard contemplates employer
liability without any showing of bad faith; a finding by a jury that the discharge was
"unfair" or "unreasonable" may suffice. See Note, supra note 38, at 383.
62. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
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cause 63 after eighteen years of continuous employment. Seemingly unconcerned about whether bad faith was involved, the court held that
"[t]ermination of employment without legal cause after... [eighteen
years of service] offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and
fair dealing contained in all contracts, including employment contracts."'64 Since juries are typically sympathetic to discharged employees from the outset, 65 the use of a malleable and potentially confusing
standard falls short of protecting employers from unwarranted recoveries. 66 Moreover, the vagueness of the "good faith" standard, as with
any imprecise theory of recovery, actually foments litigation by those
67
with otherwise frivolous claims.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may also hurt
the employee. In an effort to protect themselves from wrongful discharge suits, employers faced with a good faith standard will likely
establish formal grievance and discipline procedures through which all
63. Cleary alleged he had been discharged for union-related activities.
64. 111 Cal. App. 3d at 455, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The California Supreme
Court has recently cautioned against the approach taken in Cleary. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 698 n.39, 765 P.2d 373, 400 n.39, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 238 n.39 (1988), the court warned that "with regard to an at-will employment
relationship, breach of the implied covenant cannot logically be based on a claim that
a discharge was made without good cause. If such an interpretation applied, then all
at-will contracts would be transmuted into contracts requiring good cause for termination." Id.
65. See Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Casefor Arbitration,
13 EMP. REL. L.J. 404, 406 (1987).
66. Epstein, supra note 22, at 953. Professor Epstein writes:
[T]here is good reason for skepticism about the power of juries to divine
motive and purpose from the evidence that is presented to them. A single
case easily can be regarded either as employer oppression or employer benevolence, and there is every reason to expect that very different interpretations of similar fact patterns will proliferate under any version of the forcause standard.
Id. at 971.
67. Id. at 953. See Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 697, 765 P.2d at 399, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
237; Gould, supra note 65, at 405. On the proliferation of such suits, Professor Gould
writes:
Scarcely a day goes by during which some employee does not file suit in a
state or federal court against his or her employer, protesting a dismissal the basis for it, the way in which it was done, or the circumstances surrounding it. Although there are no precise statistics available, it is clear that
wrongful discharge litigation, which was hardly known in the 1970's, is increasing geometrically, causing most major law firms to spend at least one
half of their billable hours on them ....The cost of lawsuits that respond to
a discharge, as measured by jury awards and settlements, has also increased
geometrically and is beginning to draw concern from the business
community.
Gould, Id. at 405.
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employee problems are channelled. 68 While these procedures may be
desirable, the employer will inevitably incur costs in terms of both
time and money. These costs may be passed on to the employee by
69
reducing wages, benefits or the number of employees hired.
C.

The Public Policy Exception

The third major judicial limitation of the American rule is the
public policy exception. This doctrine prohibits an employer from discharging an employee, regardless of at-will status, for reasons contrary
to public policy. 70 Unlike the breach of an implied contract or covenant, a discharge that violates public policy gives rise to an action
68. See Note, Implied ContractRights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 369
(1974) (also suggesting, however, that another possible result may be the development
of "contractual disclaimers ... and other corporate boilerplate aimed at preserving the
power of employers to discharge employees at will"). Id. at 369 n.18.
69. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 972; Power, A Defense of the Employment At
Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 881, 892 (1983); Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1816, 1829 (1980); Note, Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the
JudicialRole, 68 IOWA L. REV. 787, 800 (1983).
Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that from the employee's perspective, the additional security afforded by the good faith standard may be worth these relatively
modest reductions.
70. The public policy exception has been adopted in thirty-five jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying Arkansas
law); Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1986); Merkel v. Scovill, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (applying Ohio law); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985); Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v.
Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Parnar v. Americana
Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist.,
98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d
353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)
(but see Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933 (Ind. 1986) (limiting the
public policy doctrine to cases where employee is discharged for filing workers' compensation claim)); Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988);
Murphy v. Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630
P.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky.
1983); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Hobson
v. McClean Hosp. Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 522 N.E.2d 975 (1982); Sventko v. Kroger
Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1976); Phipps v. Clark Oil &
Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2904 (1987); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square, Ltd., 226 Neb. 899, 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987); Hansen v.
Harrah's, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1130 (1981); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J.
58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Vigil v. Arzola, 102 N.M. 682, 699 P.2d 613 (1983); Sides v.
Duke Hosp., 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1985); Holien v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 298 Or. 76, 689 P.2d 1292 (1984); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (Super. Ct. 1978); Ludwick v. This Minute of
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sounding in tort rather than contract. 7 1 The nature of the employee's
claim thus turns more on the employer's overarching duty not to subvert public policy, rather than implied rights and obligations contained in the employment contract.
The cases decided on the premise that an employer may not discharge an employee for reasons contrary to public policy fall into four
general categories: (1) discharges for refusing to engage in illegal activity; (2) discharges for exercising a statutory right or legal privilege;
(3) discharges for fulfilling a statutory duty or public obligation; and
'72
(4) discharges in violation of "general public policy."

1. Dischargesfor Refusing to Engage in IllegalActivity. The public policy doctrine is most alluring in situations where an employee has
been discharged for refusing to engage in illegal conduct. Employers
should not be permitted to threaten job security as an inducement to
violate the law. To the extent that employers have relied on the at-will
Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985); Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433
N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984);
Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985); Bowman v. State
Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d
270 (W.Va. 1978); Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167
(1986).
Seven jurisdictions have refused to recognize the public policy exception: Amos
v. Corporation of Presiding Bishop, 594 F. Supp. 791 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Brainard v. Imperial Mfg. Co., 571 F. Supp. 37 (D.R.I.
1983) (applying Rhode Island law); Hinrichs v. Tranquilarie Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130
(Ala. 1977); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Gil v.
Metal Serv. Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La.
1982); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
Six jurisdictions have yet to adopt the exception, but indicate a willingness to do
so in the future: Laws v. Aetna Finance Co., 667 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Miss. 1987);
Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (Ct. App.
1978); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979);
Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277 (Wyo. 1985).
Two jurisdictions remain completely undecided on the issue: Hansrote v. Amer
Indus. Technologies, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (interpreting Delaware
law); ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
71. But see Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974);
Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis. 2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167 (1986).
72. See Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable At Will - A
New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARK. L. REV. 729, 730 (1981); Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1936-37 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Protecting Employees At
Will]; Note, supra note 38, at 380.
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doctrine to make such inducements, many courts have allowed the
discharged employee to bring a suit on public policy grounds.
The first public policy exception to the at-will doctrine was introduced by the California Court of Appeal in Petermann v. Local 396,
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters.73 The case involved an employee who was discharged from his job when he refused to give perjured testimony at a legislative hearing. While the court paid due
respect to the time-honored American rule, it ultimately reasoned that
"the right to discharge an employee under [the at-will doctrine] may
be limited by statute or by considerations of public policy."'74 The
court concluded that it would be obnoxious to state and public interests to allow an employer to discharge any employee for refusing to
75
engage in conduct specifically enjoined by statute.
While the perjury scenario in Petermann has proved to be the
most typical, 76 courts have recognized the public policy exception in a
variety of situations where an employee has been discharged for refusing to violate the law. 77 Despite the factual diversity, however, these
cases contain a common element: the public policy which has been
abused, and which serves as the foundation of the employee's recovery, has in every case been specifically identified by the legislature and
embodied in a statute. Thus, while these decisions compromise the
absolute power to discharge to some degree, they do so only in narrow
and well-defined circumstances. The role of the court in these cases
73. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
74. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
75. The court reasoned:
[I]n order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy against perjury,
the civil law, too, must deny the employer his generally unlimited right to
discharge an employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration,
when the reason for the dismissal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury. To hold otherwise would be without reason and contrary to the spirit
of the law .... This [would be] patently contrary to the public welfare.
Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
76. Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will, supra note 72, at 1937.
77. See, e.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (discharge for refusal to sleep with foreman contrary to Arkansas prostitution laws);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980) (discharge for refusal to participate in price-fixing scheme); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (discharge of quality control
inspector for refusal to violate the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d
385 (Ct. App. 1978) (discharge for refusal to falsify pollution control records);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)
(discharge for refusal to perform unauthorized catheterizations); Kalman v. Grand
Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (pharmacist discharged for refusing to violate a state pharmacy board regulation); Hauck v.
Sabine Pilots, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.
1985) (discharge for refusal to pollute navigable waters).
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has not been to whimsically regulate at-will employment, but rather to
enforce clear and specific legislative declarations of public policy.
2. Discharges for Exercising a Statutory Right. Some jurisdictions have also resorted to the public policy exception where an employee is discharged for exercising a legally protected right. The vast
majority of these cases involve employees who have been discharged
for filing workers' compensation claims. Since most workers' compensation schemes provide that restitution of denied benefits is the exclusive remedy, courts have traditionally prohibited separate civil suits
against the employer for damages. 78 However, with the growth of the
public policy exception in the 1970s, courts began to supplement the
statutory relief by allowing private tort actions against offending
employers.
The first case to take this step was Frampton v. CentralIndiana
Gas Co.79 Frampton was discharged after filing for disability benefits
as provided under his employer's workers' compensation policy. The
Indiana Supreme Court recognized the general rule that employers
have great discretion to discharge at-will employees. Nevertheless, the
court allowed an exception to the at-will doctrine in those cases where
the discharge was designed to prevent the employee from pursuing his
legally protected right to compensation. In allowing Frampton's
wrongful discharge suit, the court stressed the importance of effectuating the public policy goals behind the Indiana Workers' Compensation
80
Act.
[I]n order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public
policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his
right ...

without being subject to reprisal. If the employers are

permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation
claims, a most important public policy will be undermined. The
fear of being discharged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right. Employees will not file claims for justly
deserved compensation - opting, instead, to continue their employis that the emment without incident. The end result, of course,
81
ployer is effectively relieved of his obligation.
Many jurisdictions have adopted the Frampton reasoning and allowed private damage suits by at-will employees discharged for filing
workers' compensation claims.8 2 While permitting recovery in such
78. See, e.g., Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Bottijliso v.
Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981).
79. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
80. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-2-1, 2-2, 2-6 (Burns 1986 & Supp. 1988).
81. Frampton, 260 Ind. at 251-52, 297 N.E.2d at 427.
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Professional Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1983); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee Dept. of Labor Serv., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488,
630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983);
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suits does limit the traditional employer discretion, the overall effect
on at-will employment is minimal. The courts have generally reasoned that all workers' compensation schemes are themselves legislative declarations of a public policy that work-related injuries should be
compensated. 83 Judicial enforcement of this implicit, but obvious, policy is not significantly different from prohibiting discharges designed
to frustrate the criminal laws. In both situations, courts are limiting
employer discretion only to the extent permitted by specific legislative
policy goals.
3. Discharges for Fulfilling a Legal Duty or Public Obligation. Several courts that have recognized the public policy exception
have done so where an employee was discharged for fulfilling a statutory duty or non-statutory "public obligation." The most common
case involves an employee who is discharged for taking time off from
work to serve on a jury. 84 Other examples involve "whistle-blowing"
on illegal employer
conduct8 5 and refusing to violate professional ethi86
standards.
cal
To some extent, there is little difference between the statutory
duty cases and the illegal activity, or statutory prohibition, cases. In
Wiley v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 430 So. 2d 1016 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Hansome v. Northwestern
Cooperage Co., 679 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1984) (en bane); Hansen v. Harrah's, 100 Nev.
60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981);
Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Clanton v. Cain-Sloan
Co., 677 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1984); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976). But see Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss.
1981); Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that any changes of the employment-at-will doctrine are better left to the
state legislature).
83. See, e.g., Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983).
84. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler
& Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367, 1374 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1984) (applying California law). But see Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 670-71, 765 P.2d 373, 380, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 218
(1988) (denying whistle-blowing employee relief on public policy theory where public
policy, though statutorily based, was not substantial). See also Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 478-80, 427 A.2d 385, 388 (1980) (holding that a
discharge is in violation of public policy when retaliatory for reporting criminal conduct - "an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued employment."); Brown v. Physicians Mutual Ins.
Co., 679 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent
Home, Inc., 69 Or. App. 107, 110, 684 P.2d 348, 350 (1984) (stating that an employer
may not discharge an employee for fulfilling a societal obligation of reporting a statutory violation); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71-72, 417 A.2d
505, 512 (1980).
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both situations, courts have imposed an exception to at-will employment only where the discharge in question contravenes an explicit statutory declaration of public policy. Where no public policy can be
found, many courts have disallowed recovery. 87 Mallard v. Boring,88
for example, concerned an employee who was discharged for serving
on a jury. Emphasizing that the legislature had never expressly declared jury duty as a public policy to be safeguarded, the California
Court of Appeal refused to legislate from the bench by allowing the
employee to recover on public policy grounds. 89 There are some
courts, however, that have allowed this exception to have a force of its
own outside of legislative pronouncements. 90 In Nees v. Hocks,9 1 the
Oregon Supreme Court allowed recovery by a secretary who was discharged for jury service. Unlike the California court's approach in
Mallard,the Nees court did not allow legislative silence to foreclose a
wrongful discharge suit based on public policy grounds. The court
relied on constitutional guarantees to a trial by jury to assert that jury
duty was a civil obligation imposed on all Oregon citizens. The court
concluded that discharging employees for fulfilling this obligation both
'
subverts the jury system and "thwarts the will of the community. "92
The Nees approach represents a much deeper intrusion into the traditional at-will doctrine. When courts, rather than legislatures, determine the reach and breadth of the public policy exception, at-will
employment becomes subject to regulation on a case by case basis.
Such judicial regulation brings with it uncertainty as to the exact
boundaries of employer discretion.
4. Discharges in Violation of General Public Policy. The fourth,
and most controversial, application of the public policy exception involves discharges considered contrary to the general public policy of
87. See, e.g., Newman v. Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F. Supp. 535, 539 (D.D.C.
1986); Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (E.D. Mo. 1975),
aff'd, 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41
Colo. App. 465, 468, 590 P.2d 513, 515-16 (Ct. App. 1978); Goodroe v. Georgia
Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 194, 251 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ct. App. 1978); Martin v. Platt,
386 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind.Ct. App. 1979); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456
Pa. 171, 184-85, 319 A.2d 174, 180 (1974).
88. 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Ct. App. 1960).
89. In response to this decision, the California Legislature enacted a labor statute
in 1968 prohibiting the discharge of employees for serving on a jury. CAL. LABOR
CODE § 230 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1989).
90. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 132-33, 421
N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 255 Pa. Super. 28, 31, 386
A.2d 119, 120 (Super. Ct. 1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275
(W.Va. 1978). These cases allow recovery despite lack of specifically legislated public
policy.
91. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1978).
92. Id. at 219, 536 P.2d at 516.
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the state. While the cases decided on these grounds cannot be typified
by any particular factual scenario, they are nonetheless related in two
respects. First, in each case, there is a distinct absence of any specific
legislative public policy which might be used to invalidate the discharge. Second, without concrete legislative support, each decision is
founded upon a judicial declaration of general public policy.
The general public policy limitation was first adopted by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.93 The case

involved a female employee who was discharged for allegedly refusing
to date her foreman. Unable to find any preexisting public policy for
support, the court created its own, stating:
[A] termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will
which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is
not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good
and constitutes a breach of the employment contract .... Such a

rule affords the employee a certain stability of employment .... 94
In a strong dissent, Justice Grimes objected to a rule which essentially
held employers to a good cause standard for all discharges:
I cannot subscribe to the broad new unprecedented law laid down in
this case ....Not a single case has been found which supports the
broad rule laid down by the court ....In fact, the law everywhere
uniformly supported by scores of cases is that an employment contract for an indefinite period is one "at will and is terminable at any
time by either party" regardless of motive for "good cause, bad
cause or no cause" and for "any reason or no reason." 95

Illinois followed the Monge approach in Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co.9 6 Palmateer, an at-will employee, was discharged for

encouraging a police investigation of his employer's operations, which
Palmateer suspected violated several criminal statutes. Palmateer had
not only assisted in the investigation, but also agreed to testify against
fellow employees. The Illinois Supreme Court recognized that there is
no statutory duty or legal obligation on citizens to become "whistleblowers" whenever criminal activity is suspected. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff's suit for retaliatory discharge was permitted on the grounds
that "public policy . ..favors citizen crime-fighters." 97 The public

policy which the employer had purportedly contravened was broadly
defined by the court as "what is right and just and what affects the
citizens of the State collectively. [Public policy] ...

is to be found in

the State's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in its
93. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
94. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
95. Id. at 135-36, 316 A.2d at 553 (Grimes, J., dissenting) (quoting Payne v. Webster & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds, Hutton v.
Waters, 132 Tenn. 527, 544, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (1915)).
96. 85 II1.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
97. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
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judicial decisions." 9 The court held that "[p]ublic policy favors
Palmateer's conduct in volunteering information to the law-enforcement agency... [and assisting] in the investigation and prosecution of
the suspected crime." 9 9
Most jurisdictions have refused to follow the broad path blazed
by New Hampshire and Illinois. In fact, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court has since softened its decision in Monge. l00 Most courts continue to require a distinct, unambiguous, legislative declaration of relevant public policy before limiting the at-will doctrine. 10 1 This general
reticence to embrace such a broad exception can be traced to several
well-founded concerns.
First, the general public policy exception is likely to encourage
frivolous suits. 102 The public policy as declared by legislative bodies is
usually directed at furthering the purposes of some specific statutory
scheme. Thus, an exception to at-will employment based on such declarations has a definable scope and context. By sharp contrast, judicially declared, or "general" public policy, defies the limits and quicky
98. Id.
99. Id. at 133, 421 N.E.2d at 880. The Palmateer decision also spurred a strong
dissent. Justice Ryan objected:
I cannot agree to extend the cause of action for retaliatory discharge.., into
the nebulous area of judicially created public policy, as has been done... in
this case. I fear that the result of this opinion will indeed fulfill the prophecy
of Mr. Justice Underwood's dissent in Kelsay. "Henceforth, no matter how
indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an employee may be, . . . [the] employer may thereafter discharge him only at the risk of being compelled to
defend a suit for retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive damages."
Id. at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,
74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (Underwood, J., dissenting)).
100. Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981);
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980) (both cases restrict
the Monge principle to situations where an employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public
policy would condemn).
101. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 47, 432 A.2d 464,
473 (1981); Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 389-90, 509 N.E.2d
297, 300 (App. Ct. 1987); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 184-85, 319
A.2d 174, 180 (1974).
102. See, e.g., Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill.
App. 3d 994, 998-99, 411 N.E.2d
50, 53-54 (App. Ct. 1980). In Rozier, the Illinois Court of Appeals refused to adopt a
general exception, stating:
The ... insidious danger,... is that an employer may justly discharge an
employee only at the risk of being compelled to defend a suit for retaliatory
discharge. If such a cause of action generally could be maintained, employers, particularly those in small businesses, would be thrust into economic
dilemma by every employment decision.
Id. See also Note, supra -note 11, at 228-29.
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devolves into an amorphous principle of equity. This comfortable imprecision provides an alluring theory of recovery for discharged employees who otherwise would not have thought of filing suit. 10

3

The

public policy announced in Palmateer,that "what is right and just and
what affects the citizens of the State collectively,"' 04 could arguably
protect even the most frivolous suit from dismissal.10 5 Such an approach leads to an unfortunate waste of employer and judicial resources.106 Second, adopting such a broad basis for recovery is likely
to chill employers from fully exercising their discretion over the work

place. 107
Employers will, of course, be sensitive to the cost and trouble of
defending frivolous tort suits. While such concerns may not seem particularly "chilling," there is more cause for apprehension. An employer who discharges an at-will employee and is found to have
transgressed the meandering boundaries of general public policy will
be liable in tort rather than contract. Recoveries are therefore likely to
103. Mallor, supra note 11, at 461-62; Note, supra note 11, at 229; Blades, supra
note 21, at 1428; Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.: Is the Public Policy
Exception to the At Will Doctrinea Bad Omen for the Employment Relationship?, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 1187, 1197 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical

Corp.].
104. 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
105. A good example of a typical frivolous suit encouraged by a broad public policy exception is Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). In
Scroghan, the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
claim that his discharge for attending night school violated a public policy in favor of
higher education. See also Prussing v. General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 366, 269
N.W.2d 181 (1978) (plaintiff claimed that his discharge for refusal to accept a transfer
to Brazil was merely a pretext and violated public policy); Ward v. Frito-Lay Inc., 95
Wis. 2d 372, 290 N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980) (plaintiff, discharged after relationship
with fellow worker caused dissention among employees, claimed discharge violated
Wisconsin public policy in favor of peaceful labor relations).
106. See Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 142-44, 421 N.E.2d at 884-85 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
107. In his seminal article on the subject, Professor Blades has cautioned:
[T]here is the danger that the average jury will identify with, and therefore
believe, the employee. This possibility could give rise to vexatious lawsuits
by disgruntled employees fabricating plausible tales of employer coercion. If
the potential for vexatious suits by discharged employees is too great, employers will be inhibited in exercising their best judgment as to which employees should or should not be retained. And while as a matter of
constitutional law the right of discharge is no longer absolute and inviolable,
the employer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judgements
about employees is important in our free enterprise system.
Blades, supra note 21, at 1428. See also Note, supra note 11, at 226-28 (arguing that
jurisdictions adopting the public policy doctrine have created an "atmosphere of uncertainty in the workplace").
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far exceed the cost of back pay and may even include punitive damages and damages for emotional distress. 10 8 While it may be intuitively argued that the honest employer has no cause to fear wrongful
discharge recoveries, such arguments are unrealistic. Many times employees may be discharged for legitimate, but nevertheless subjective,
reasons. This is especially true with managerial or upper level employees,' 0 9 for example, where the employee's demeanor or personality is
ill-suited for the job or deteriorates an otherwise cohesive management
team. To the extent that these subjective reasons cannot be fully articulated, even the most innocent employers have cause for concern.
Moreover, that concern is compounded by the stark realization that as
between a profit-maximizing employer and a jobless ex-employee,
most juries will instinctively sympathize with the latter. 10 Thus, for
an employer who is wary of accidentally offending "general public policy," it may in fact appear less costly to retain an indolent or inefficient
employee than to risk a wrongful discharge suit. " 'I In the event a suit
is filed, employers will be more disposed to settle out of court than to
defend their decision to discharge.
Finally, there is concern that by allowing recoveries on the basis
of general public policy, the courts risk warding off new industry and
thereby retarding business development and economic growth. Given
the choice between (1) a state that limits at-will discharges only to the
108. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978);
Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1980); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). Notably, however, most
courts adopting the public policy exception have required punitive damages to be
based on a showing of malicious, fraudulent or oppressive misconduct. See, e.g.,
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). See also Mallor, supra
note 11, at 481.
109. Professor Blades makes the following distinction:
The higher ranking the employee, the more important to the success of the
business is his effective performance. Compounding the potential for undue
inhibition of the employer's judgment at the higher echelons of employment
is the greater difficulty of articulating the basis for a discharge at that level.
Compared to the wage earner, whose routine duties can generally be measured against a mechanical standard, the value of the salaried employee is
more likely to be measured in such intangible qualities as imagination, initiative, drive, and personality. The employer's evaluation of the higher ranking
employee is usually a highly personalized, intuitive judgment, and, as such,
is more difficult to translate into concrete reasons which someone else - a
juryman - can readily understand and appreciate.
Blades, supra note 21, at 1428. See also Gould, supra note 65, at 414; Note, Pierce v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra note 103, at 1196.
110. See Mallor, supra note 11, at 491; Blades, supra note 21, at 1428.
111. As Professor Gould states the dilemma: "There are many cases where employers have been fearful to dismiss a marginal or unproductive employee as they look
down the barrel of a jury gun about to cock." Gould, supra note 65, at 411.
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extent that they contravene statutory policy and (2) a state which imposes a general policy developed on a case by case basis, new industry
will likely choose the former. In an often cited dissent to the
Palmateerruling, 1 2 Justice Ryan raised the new business issue:
The deteriorating business climate in this State is a topic of substantial interest .... It must be acknowledged ... that Illinois is not
attracting a great amount of new industry and business and that
industries are leaving the State at a troublesome rate. I do not believe that this court should further contribute to the declining business environment by creating a vague concept of public policy
which will permit an employer to discharge an unwanted employee,
one who could be completely disruptive of labor management relations.., only at the risk of being sued in tort not13only for compensatory damages, but also for punitive damages.'
Such concerns should be particularly weighty in developing states,
such as Alaska, whose long term economic prosperity hinge on eco1 14
nomic diversification.
IV.

THE STATE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT IN ALASKA

Alaska's recognition of the American rule can be traced back to
the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in Long v. Newby. 115 While the
court did not explicitly pronounce its acceptance of the doctrine, Justice Erwin declared that "[t]he circumstances in the case ... demonstrate[d] a contract terminable at will.""16 Thus, where the duration
of employment is indeterminate, the court implied that the American
rule is to govern."17 Since the Newby decision, the at-will doctrine has
been gradually modified by both the Alaska Legislature and the
courts. For the most part, these piecemeal modifications have kept
pace with the national trend toward greater employee protection from
abusive discharge or, put differently, toward a greater limitation of
employer discretion over at-will employees. Although the legislative
efforts have been measured and relatively scant, the Alaska courts
have been more forceful. The Alaska Supreme Court has shown little
hesitation in limiting the at-will doctrine through both the implied
112. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 136-45, 421 N.E.2d
876, 881-86 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
114. See Note, Employment at Will: An Analysis and Critique of the JudicialRole,
supra note 69, at 805.
115. 488 P.2d 719 (Alaska 1971).
116. Id. at 724.
117. Crook, supra note 12, at 34.
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contract' 18 and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theodes." 9 Notably, however, the court's efforts to protect at-will employees have stayed within the boundaries of contract law. While a
majority of states continue to broaden the scope of wrongful discharge
suits to include tort claims, Alaska has so far refrained from making
0
this leap.12
A. Legislative Action
While most of the legislative protection enjoyed by employees in
Alaska is in the form of federal statutes, 121 the state legislature has
also taken some modest steps toward discouraging wrongful discharge.' 2 2 The Alaska Human Rights Law 123 prohibits discharges on
the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin or other typical discriminatory motivations.12 4 Retaliatory discharge of employees who assist
in enforcing the Act is also prohibited. 2 5 Similarly, the Alaska Wage
and Hour Act 126 prohibits the discharge of an employee who "has filed
a complaint, or has instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding ... or has testified or is about to testify in . .. a proceeding"
concerning the employer's violation of the Act. 127 Recent legislation
prohibits the discharge of employees who answer a call to jury service.' 28 Other legislative modifications of the at-will doctrine include
enactments which protect employees who refuse to submit to a lie detector test,' 2 9 and whose income has been subjected to an assignment
130
order for child support.
118. See Eales v. Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958
(Alaska 1983). For a general discussion, see supra notes 38-46 and accompanying
text.
119. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983). See also supra notes
48-69 and accompanying text.
120. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988) (holding that
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing which is implied in all at-will
contracts, does not constitute a tort).
121. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
122. See generally Crook, supra note 12, at 35.
123. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.010-.300 (1986).
124. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1) (1986). The Human Rights Law, however,
does allow discharges for age, disability, pregnancy or other personal characteristics
which reasonably impair job performance.
125. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(4) (1986).
126. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.050-.150 (1984).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.135 (1984).
128. ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.037 (Supp. 1988).
129. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1984).
130. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.132(f) (1983).
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Despite these statutory protections, the Alaska Legislature has
stopped short of addressing many typical motivations for abusive discharge.' 3 ' At-will employees who are discharged for filing workers'
compensation claims remain unprotected by any particular legislative
effort. Similarly, Alaska has not enacted any laws that prohibit employers from influencing the political activities or opinions of employees,' 3 2 or that protect employees who "blow the whistle" on illegal
33
employer conduct of any type.'
B.

Implied Contract

Alaska courts have been more forceful than the legislature in limiting an emp[oyer's discretion to discharge at will. In particular, the
Alaska Supreme Court has shown a willingness to scrutinize the employment relationship for implied assurances of job security and to
give such assurances contractual force.' 34 For example, in Eales v.
Tanana Valley Medical-SurgicalGroup, Inc., 135 the court used the implied contract approach to find that an employee who had been promised a job until retirement could not be fired without cause after only
six years. Dismissing the traditional notion that added consideration
is necessary to support a promise for permanent employment,' 36 the
court reasoned:
Evidence was presented that it was represented to Eales that so long
as he was properly performing his duties he would not be discharged. This representation may be found to be part of Eales' employment contract, even if the employment contract was for an
indefinite period of time ....

If so, the Clinic would be precluded

137
from discharging Eales except for cause.

131. See Crook, supra note 12, at 35.
132. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-1102 (West 1971).
133. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102.5(b) (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 31-51m(b) (Supp. 1989). For a list of other such state laws, see Lab. L.
Rep. (CCH)
43,035-43,055.
134. See discussion supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
135. 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983).
136. The court relied heavily on Professor Corbin's treatise:
[I]f the employer made a promise, either express or implied, not only to pay
for the service but also that the employment should continue for a period of
time that is either definite or capable of being determined, that employment
is not terminable by him "at will" after the employee has begun or rendered
some of the requested service or has given any other consideration (or has
acted in reliance on the promise in such a manner as to make applicable the
rule in Restatement, Contracts, § 90).
Id. at 960 (quoting A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 152 at 14 (1963)). Eales claimed that
he would not have given up his old job had it not been for the Clinic's assurances of
job security. The court implied that even if consideration were necessary, this reliance
by Eales would suffice to disengage the normal at-will rule. Id. at 959.
137. Id. at 959 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980)).
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Ultimately, therefore, the court allowed the employer's oral assurances of job security to modify what was in all other respects an at-will
38
relationship.
The court has applied the same implied contract analysis to cases
in which the employer's "promises" of security were written rather
than oral. In Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 139 the plaintiff
was discharged for fighting on company premises. Although the
plaintiff was an at-will employee, he alleged that he could be discharged only for good cause since this "promise" had been made to
every employee in the company handbook. While the court ruled that
fighting does constitute just cause for discharge, it nevertheless agreed
with the proposition that at-will employment may be modified by employer promises. The court noted: "[The] handbook is important because, while courts have held that there is not a uniform right to just
cause for termination, . . . it is well recognized that where employers
indicate that termination will only occur for cause, they must comply
or be liable for damages."' 14
C. Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The Alaska Supreme Court has also relied on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to blunt employer discretion and
soften the effects of the at-will doctrine. The leading case on the implied covenant theory is Mitford v. de Lasala.141 Mitford was employed as the treasurer of two corporations owned or controlled by the
de Lasala family. At the time of his hiring, Mitford received a letter
confirming the terms of his employment. The letter provided that
Mitford was to be employed "at a remuneration in lieu of a fixed salary based on 10% of profits ...but with a minimum guaranteed drawing allowance of U.S.$850.[00]-per month."' 14 2 The letter further
declared: "The period of your employment is for an indefinite period
143
subject to determination by either side giving three months notice."'
Fifteen years later, Mitford was discharged after claiming he was entitled to collect on the 10% profit-sharing arrangement.
138. The court has recently noted, however, that such assurances must include
some unambiguous, specific mention of employment duration before an implied contract will be found. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1131
(Alaska 1989).
139. 727 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1986).
140. Id. at 1056 (citing Gram v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 384 Mass. 659, 429 N.E.2d
21 (1981); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980)).
141. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
142. Id. at 1002.

143. Id.
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In his suit against Ernest de Lasala and a host of corporations, 144
Mitford alleged that his discharge was motivated by a desire to keep
him from collecting his share of the profits earned during his employment. 14 5 After integrating the de Lasala letter into the employment
contract, Justice Matthews addressed the question of whether an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be enforced in an
employment context. Looking to Massachusetts for guidance, the
court reviewed in detail the reasoning of Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co. 146 and its progeny. 147 Persuaded by the reasoning of
these cases, the court held that Mitford's contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 148 The court ruled that
the covenant prohibited "firing Mitford for the purpose of preventing
him from sharing in future profits."' 149 While the Mitford court did
not explicitly apply its reasoning beyond the immediate facts of the
case, the court has subsequently interpreted the decision to extend the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to all at-will employment contracts. 50
In a recent decision on the issue, the court has expanded the implied covenant theory to encompass discharges that breach public policy. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling,Inc. 15' involved the discharge
144. Mitford's suit named twenty-three defendants including Robert de Lasala's
son, Ernest, who had succeeded to his father's corporate throne, and twenty-two corporations. The original complaint named only three corporations (Australaska, Cosmopolitan and Alaska Enterprises) as defendants alleging breach of contract and
entitlement to 10% of the corporate profits as agreed. The complaint was amended to
add eighteen affiliated corporations alleged to be part of the profit-making chain. Id. at
1003.

145. Id.
146. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). See supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
147. Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351
(1982) (holding that a discharge to avoid payment of commissions is a discharge in
bad faith and constitutes a breach of contract).
148. Notably, the court also relied on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
which provides: "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance or its enforcement." Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1006 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)). Another source of support came from the court's earlier decision in Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281 (Alaska
1979), in which it ruled that "in every contract, including contracts of insurance, there
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement."
Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1006 (emphasis added, footnote omitted) (citing Guin, 591 P.2d
at 1291).
149. Mitford, 666 P.2d at 1007. The court, however, remanded the case to allow
the defendants an opportunity to offer evidence to rebut the presumption of bad faith
created by the facts. Id.
150. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Alaska 1988).
151. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
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of two at-will employees who refused to submit to company drug tests.
The plaintiffs alleged that the drug tests violated employee rights to
privacy and that, consequently, the discharges breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Writing for the majority, Justice Compton declared that the state public policy protects an employee's right to privacy:
Thus, the citizens' right to be protected against unwarranted intru-

sions into their private lives has been recognized in the law of
Alaska. The constitution protects against governmental intrusion,
statutes protect against employer intrusion, and the common law
protects against intrusions by other private persons. As a result,

there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that there exof employee conduct into
ists a public policy protecting spheres
152

which employers may not intrude.
The court ultimately determined that the public policy favoring
privacy is outweighed by the countervailing policy supporting worker
health and safety.1 53 The court concluded that the drug tests were
permissible as long as they were "conducted at a time reasonably contemporaneous with the employee's work time" 154 and the employee
received sufficient notice of the drug testing policy.1 55 Significantly,
however, the court made a point of noting that discharges against public policy may constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 156 Moreover, the court endorsed the Illinois
Supreme Court's definition of public policy as "what is right and just
and . . . affects the citizens of the State collectively."' 157 Thus, the
Luedtke opinion suggests a construction of the implied covenant
which, though sounding in contract, is as broad as the general public
policy exception.
D. The Public Policy Tort: Walt and Akers
Alaska court decisions prior to 1988 have nurtured an interesting
tension in wrongful discharge law. The court has shown a willingness
to modify an entrenched employment doctrine with relatively new
contract theories in cases such as Eales 15 8 and Mitford.159 The court
152. Id. at 1133.
153. Id. at 1136.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1137.
156. Id.
157. Id.at 1132 (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124,
130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Alaska 1983)). See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying

text.
158. 663 P.2d 958 (Alaska 1983). See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983). See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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has not hesitated to look for unilateral contracts and implied covenants to provide added security against abusive discharge. Nevertheless, the court apppears wary of moving beyond contract law and
tapping into more expansive tort theories of recovery. 160 While other
jurisdictions are allowing recoveries in tort for discharges contrary to
public policy, 161 the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to squarely confront the issue. The recent decisions of Walt v. State 162 and ARCO
Alaska, Inc. v. Akers163 underscore this preference for contract theories of wrongful discharge. Walt and Akers highlight the question
which has yet to be answered: Should Alaska adopt the public policy
tort exception to at-will employment?164
1. Walt v.State.165 Ron Walt was employed by the state as a
development specialist for the Department of Commerce and Economic Development ("DCED"). Walt was not an at-will employee.
His employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement
negotiated on his behalf by the Alaska Public Employees Association
("APEA"). Part of Walt's job was to make public presentations on
various economic development projects. In 1984, Walt attended a
public conference on the development of a large-scale mining project
in Kotzebue known as the Red Dog Mine. When asked how likely it
was that the mine would succeed, Walt was skeptical and cautionary.
He advised the business community "not to base their personal or economic decisions on the existence of the Red Dog Mine."' 166 Walt's
remarks were printed in a local paper which was eventually brought to
the attention of the DCED Commissioner. After a short meeting at
160. See Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 793 (Alaska
1986) (no cause of action for tortious interference with employment contract); State v.
Haley, 687 P.2d 305 (Alaska 1984) (unconstitutional discharge by state gives rise to an
action in contract); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983) (choosing to
make good faith and fair dealing an implied obligation sounding in contract).
161. See supra note 70.
162. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
163. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
164. The court mentioned the public policy doctrine only once before Walt and
Akers. In Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986), the
plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongfully discharged for reporting drug and alcohol abuse by coemployees. The complaint included a claim that the discharge was
contrary to public policy. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court
acknowledged that the public policy theory has been adopted in many states but refused to consider applying it to the case at hand because a full record was not available. Id. at 792. Nevertheless, the court reversed dismissal, asserting that a complaint
which states a novel theory does not automatically disqualify the suit. Id. Like Akers,
the Knight case introduced, but left undecided, the public policy question.
165. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
166. Walt, 751 P.2d at 1346.
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which Walt was questioned about the incident and his knowledge of
the mining operations, Walt was discharged. The Commissioner
claimed that Walt's comments had "damaged the State's position on
the project" and were made "without proper knowledge
of the project
' 67
or authorization to provide such information."'
After filing a grievance with the APEA, Walt was reinstated with
back pay by order of the Department of Administration which also
required that an official letter of reprimand be placed in Walt's personnel file. Walt sought to reverse the reprimand decision through arbitration but the arbitrator upheld the order. In 1986, Walt's position
was eliminated by the state legislature for budgetary reasons.
Having exhausted the grievance procedure, Walt filed suit against
the state, alleging, among other claims: 68 (1) negligent failure to investigate the reasons for his dismissal; (2) tortious violation of state
statutory and personnel rules governing public employee discharges;169 and (3) wrongful discharge for reasons contrary to general
public policy. Walt further claimed that the state's conduct entitled
him to recover damages for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as punitive damages. 70 The superior court
agreed with the state's argument that "Walt's employment rights
[were] protected by a collective bargaining agreement between the
state and [the] APEA .... [Therefore] Walt's
causes of actions based
7
on tort and contract claims [were] barred."'1'
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the state had waived its
right to have Walt's tort claims arbitrated and therefore concluded
that the grievance procedure was not an exclusive remedy or an automatic bar to Walt's claims. Despite this holding, however, the court
struck down all of Walt's tort claims as unfounded. First, addressing
itself to the claim that the state had negligently failed to investigate the
grounds of Walt's discharge, the court denied that any such common
law tort exists and reaffirmed an earlier holding that "the state does
not owe its citizens a duty of care" in these matters. 72 More pointedly, the court concluded that this particular claim was a vain attempt
by Walt to change a breach of contract into a common law tort. Refusing to broaden the wrongful discharge recovery basis, the court
stated: "To the extent that Walt has attempted to allege a tort based
167. Id.
168. Walt's other claims consisted of allegations that his rights to free speech and
substantive due process had been denied in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1989). 751 P.2d at 1347.

169.

ALASKA STAT.

§ 39.25.160(f) (1987).

170. Walt, 751 P.2d at 1347. See also id. at 1354.
171. Id. at 1350.
172. Id. at 1351 (quoting Stevens v. State, 746 P.2d 908, 912 n.5 (Alaska 1987)).
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on a bad faith, unfair discharge we similarly conclude that such allegations give rise to a breach of contract action but not to a common law
173
tort action."
Second, the court addressed the claim that the state was liable in
tort for violating a statute1 74 which required all official action affecting
public employment to be based on merit. The court denied the claim
by holding that the statute in question had been superseded by the
Public Employment Relations Act 175 and the collective bargaining
agreement, which together imposed a just cause standard on employee
discipline. 176 Importantly, however, the court noted that even if the
statute was applicable to Walt's case, the legislature had not manifested any intent to create a separate cause of action in tort whenever
the statute is violated.
Finally, the court addressed Walt's claim that he had been discharged for reasons contrary to public policy.' 77 In denying this final
tort claim, the court reviewed several decisions by other jurisdictions 78 and the United States Supreme Court 179 which have held that
implied tort actions based on violations of public policy are precluded
where a comprehensive remedial scheme is already safeguarding public employee rights.' 80 Agreeing with the reasoning of these opinions,
the court found that Walt was well protected by the collective bargaining agreement, the Public Employement Relations Act and the Alaska
173. Id.
174. ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.160(f) (1987) (providing that "action affecting the employment status of employee classified service including appointment, promotion, demotion, suspension, or removal, may not be taken or withheld for a reason not related
to merit").
175. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.40.070-.260 (1984).
176. Walt, 751 P.2d at 1351.
177. Walt alleged that he was discharged for candidly informing the public about
the Red Dog Mine. Walt claimed that he had a duty to provide "accurate and sound
advice to small business" and that a discharge for fulfilling that duty violated public
policy. Id. at 1352 n.14.
178. Cox. v. United Technologies, Essex Group, Inc., 240 Kan. 95, 727 P.2d 456
(1986); Phillips v. Babcock & Wilcox, 349 Pa. Super. 351, 503 A.2d 36 (Super. Ct.
1986), appeal denied, 514 Pa. 618, 521 A.2d 933 (1987).
179. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
180. Significantly, the court also relied on a Massachusetts decision, Melley v. Gillette Corp., 19 Mass. App. 511, 475 N.E.2d 1227 (App. Ct. 1985), aff'd, 397 Mass.
1004, 491 N.E.2d 252 (1986), which refused to imply a tort claim for age discrimination in a private, at-will context. The Massachussets court ruled that tort claims based
on public policy violations cannot coexist with a comprehensive remedial statute. In
Massachusetts, the public policy against discrimination is protected by a legislative
scheme which provides for administrative remedies by the Massachusetts Commission
Against Discrinination. Id. at 512, 475 N.E.2d at 1228.
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State Personnel Act, and therefore concluded that, in the factual context of Walt, "it would be inappropriate to imply or recognize an intentional tort ...based on a violation of public policy." 181 Because
none of Walt's tort claims survived, the court denied recovery of dam183
ages for emotional distress1 82 and punitive damages.
Although the Walt case specifically addressed public sector employment, the court's opinion holds several possible implications for
private employment at will. First, the court makes it clear that, by
itself, a suit brought for wrongful discharge sounds in contract rather
than tort. Moreover, the court shows that attempts to disguise breach
of contract actions as tort claims are destined to fail. Second, the
opinion reveals that even where a discharge violates a particular statute, the court will not allow a tort cause of action on that basis alone
unless the legislature has specifically provided for such additional remedies. Finally, in holding that comprehensive remedial schemes preclude public policy tort actions, the court intimates that where the
employee has adequate protection through other means, creating additional tort remedies is unnecessary. The specific holding in Walt is
thus drawn from two more general judicial leanings: (1) a basic preference for contract solutions in wrongful discharge suits and (2) a reticence to make far-reaching tort theories and large awards available to
discharged employees who would not otherwise be able to recover.
2. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers. One month after the Alaska
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Walt, ARCO Alaska, Inc. v.
Akers 1 84 was decided. Unlike Walt, Akers directly concerned the
rights of an at-will employee. For almost seven years Paul Akers
worked at Prudhoe Bay as a mechanical technician for ARCO. Over
the course of his employment, Akers's performance was questioned on
several occasions by ARCO management. At one point, Akers was
called into a counseling session by his supervisors and was told to improve his attitude, which the supervisor described as obstinate and uncooperative. Two years later, Akers filed an application for permanent
assignment as a vibration technician. His supervisor denied the application because of Akers's uncooperative behavior and inability to
work productively with fellow employees. Later, the supervisor told
Akers that he was required to attend several employee communication
meetings. When Akers missed one of these meetings, the supervisor
181. Walt, 751 P.2d at 1353.
182. Walt alleged that as a result of his discharge, his entire family suffered extreme emotional distress for which compensation was owed. Id. at 1350.
183. Id. at 1354.
184. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
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placed an official letter of reprimand in Akers's personnel file.' 8 5 On
another occasion, Akers directly disobeyed an order given by the lead
technician at a central compressor plant. As a result of these and similar incidents, Akers was discharged for uncooperative behavior and an
inability to get along with co-workers.' s6 When Akers applied for unemployment compensation, ARCO sent a letter to the Department of
Labor characterizing Akers's discharge as "insubordination in willful
disregard of the employer's interest."' 187 Although discharges of this
nature normally preclude the collection of unemployment compensation, Akers was nevertheless given the benefits.
Akers brought suit against ARCO, alleging breach of contract
and improper opposition to his application for unemployment compensation.188 The trial court directed a verdict in ARCO's favor on
the improper opposition claim. On the surviving claims, however, the
jury found that ARCO had breached an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing and awarded8 9Akers more than $175,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.
In addressing the issues, the Alaska Supreme Court began by stating that "[t]he purpose of awarding contract damages is to compensate
the injured party ... [not] to punish the party in breach."' 190 In so
doing, the court reaffirmed an earlier holding '91 that punitive damages may not be recovered in a breach of contract action unless the
breaching conduct rises to the level of an independent tort.
Having reestablished this principle, the court turned to the main
issue of whether the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing constitutes a tort which can support a claim for punitive
damages. The court's first concern was the possibility that the discharge had violated some public policy. Along these lines, the court
considered the trial court's conclusion that the "bad faith breach of
employment contracts should ... be deemed violative of state public
185. Akers objected to this action on the grounds that (1) he missed the meeting
because the medication he was taking for an injury made him pass out; (2) other
employees who had missed meetings were not reprimanded; and (3) the employee
handbook stated that a counseling session must be held before any disciplinary action.
Id. at 1151.
186. Id. at 1152.
187. Id.
188. Akers also named as defendants two of his former supervisors and the employee relations director, all of whom allegedly interfered with Akers's contractual
relationship with ARCO. This claim did not survive a directed verdict. Id. at 115253.
189. Compensatory damages totalled $51,390, and punitive damages totalled
$125,000. Id. at 1153.
190. Id. (quoting Wein Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 631 (Alaska 1986)

(quoting
191.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 355, comment a (1981))).

Wein Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627 (Alaska 1986).
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policy. 1 92 In a footnote, the court rejected this contention outright,
declaring that under such a theory "any breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing would... [become a tort] under the public
policy exception." 19 3 The court refused, therefore, to hold that a bad
faith discharge automatically gave rise to a public policy tort claim.
The court also examined the general theory recognized in other
jurisdictions that where the discharge of at-will employees violates
fundamental principles of public policy, employers may be held liable
in tort. 194 In summarizing this case law, the court identified four typical discharge situations resulting in tort liability: (1) discharges for
refusing to participate in a price-fixing scheme; (2) discharges for
union activities; (3) discharges for serving on a jury; and (4) discharges
for filing workers' compensation claims. 195 Having recognized these
narrow applications, however, the court expressly declined to accept
or reject the public policy exception. 196 Akers, the court reasoned,
"does not allege that his termination violated an explicit public policy.
Instead, Akers claims that.., the mere violation of the covenant con197
stitutes a tort which will support punitive damages."
Leaving the public policy issue completely undecided, the court
proceeded to consider whether there were any other circumstances
under which a breach of the implied covenant may result in tort liability. The court reaffirmed that absent the commission of a "traditionally recognized tort," 198 only contract damages may be awarded in
wrongful discharge suits. It ultimately concluded that "[m]ere breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ... does not
constitute [such] a [traditionally recognized] tort,"' 199 and therefore re200
versed the award of punitive damages to Akers.
192. Akers, 753 P.2d at 1153 n.l.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
195. 753 P.2d at 1153.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis added). It is likely that Akers's complaint was a tailored interpretation of an earlier decision by the court which hinted that an employer's respect
for public policy was part of the good faith requirement. In Knight v. American
Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1986), the court stated in dicta that "it
seems that the public policy approach is largely encompassed within the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 792. Dismissing Akers's public policy
claim on the grounds that it was based on the "mere violation of the covenant" indicates that the court is actually more wary of the public policy concept than a casual
reading of Knight might suggest. Akers, 753 P.2d at 1153.
198. Id. at 1154.
199. Id.
200. Id. The compensatory damage award was affirmed. Id. at 1158.
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As in Walt v. State,20 1 the court's opinion in Akers highlights a
preference to analyze wrongful discharge suits under contract principles. Indeed, Akers goes a step further than Walt by restricting the
role of tort law in wrongful discharge cases to the commission of
"traditional" independent torts. Both opinions betray a sensitivity to
the possibility of frivolous lawsuits and call for caution in any future
expansion of wrongful discharge recovery. In keeping with this apprehension, the court has remained equivocal about recognizing a public
policy exception to at-will employment.
V.

THREE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS

Together, Walt and Akers have ushered Alaska jurisprudence to
the brink of two important, interrelated and, as yet, unanswered questions. First, there is the fundamental quandary of whether the court
should countenance a public policy exception to at-will employment.
Second, if the public policy exception is adopted, what limitations, if
any, will the court impose to restrict its reach? Ultimately, the resolution of these issues will turn on several well-founded concerns about
the efficacy of expanding the nature and scope of wrongful discharge
liability. 20 2
One such concern is the significant increase in litigation that inevitably accompanies the broadening of recovery theories. 20 3 Since a
substantial percentage of these new claims are likely to be opportunistic, questions are raised about the efficient use of judicial resources and
the integrity of the judicial system generally.
A second concern is the effect that expanded liability may have
on legitimate employer discretion in the workplace. To the extent that
increased litigation and large recoveries inhibit the full exercise of employer rights, 2°4 the public policy exception may not be worth the added employee protection it offers.
Finally, the public policy exception raises issues affecting state
economic growth. Like other faltering oil-based economies, Alaska's
long-term prosperity hinges on industrial diversification, which, in
turn, depends partly upon the influx of new business. Insofar as
greater liability inhibits employer discretion and increases labor costs,
recognizing a broad public policy exception may work to slow the diversification process.
201. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
202. See discussion supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text.
203. Blades, supra note 21, at 1428; Mallor, supra note 11, at 461; Note, supra note
11, at 229; Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra note 103, at 1197.
204. See Blades, supra note 21, at 1428; Mallor, supra note 11, at 461; Note, supra
note 11, at 229; Note, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., supra note 103, at 1197.
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These and similar concerns suggest that an expansion of employer
liability for wrongful discharge will exact a price. Indeed, the infusion
of tort remedies into the employment relationship is laden with unseen
costs. These costs are paid by the employer, the industrial economy,
the judicial system and, at least indirectly, the employees themselves. 20 5 Thus, any modifications to the at-will doctrine along public
policy lines should be made with hesitation and only when absolutely
necessary to protect employee rights from abuse. The following alternative proposals are offered as illustrations to suggest that protecting
employee rights in Alaska does not require a complete undermining of
the American rule. Collectively, the proposals counsel against the
adoption of a general, judicially created public policy exception to atwill employment.
A.

No Public Policy Exception

The most unencumbered resolution of the issue is simply to refuse
to recognize any public policy exception at all. Seven states have declined to give wrongful discharge claimants the right to recover on
public policy grounds. 20 6 The collective rationale for such a position is
threefold. First, the courts in these states have expressed concerns
that opening up the employment relationship to public policy claims
would entail unacceptable judicial legislation. They have decided that
the character of private employment is enough of a public concern
that legislatures rather than courts should be responsible for altering
traditional legal relationships between employer and employee. 20 7 In
determining general public policy claims, many of these courts have
quoted at length the observations of the New York Court of Appeals
in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.:208
In addition to the fundamental question whether such [public policy] liability should be recognized .... of no less practical importance is the definition of its configuration if it is to be recognized.
Both of these aspects of the issue, involving perception and
declaration of relevant public policy... are best and more appropriately explored and resolved by the legislative branch of our government. The Legislature has infinitely greater resources and
205. See Epstein, supra note 22, at 972-73; Gould, supra note 65, at 412-13; Note,
supra note 38, at 388.
206. See supra note 70.
207. Contra Springer v. Weeks and Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Iowa 1988)
("The issue is, we believe, a generic one more nearly related to the common law tort
which has been recognized for improper interference with existing business relationships than with any single substantive topic with which the legislature might deal.").
208. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). In Murphy, the
plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for disclosing to company officials his
suspicions of corruption in the accounting department. The court refused to recognize
a general cause of action for retaliatory discharge based on public policy.
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procedural means to discern the public will, to examine the variety
of pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of the various seg-

ments of the community that would be directly affected ...and to

investigate and anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability.
If the rule of nonavailability for termination of at will employment
is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a principled
statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation,
rather than in consequence of judicial resolution
of the partisan ar20 9
guments of individual adversarial litigants.
A second reason these states have refused to adopt the public policy exception is that the very notion of "public policy" is so vague and
omnipresent that it evades any attempts at standardization. Without
the development of reasoned standards of conduct, courts find it difficult to connect their decisions logically, and consequently, employers
find it difficult to anticipate exactly what they can and cannot do. The
standard that the Illinois Supreme Court arrived at in Palmateer v.
InternationalHarvesterCo. 2 10 is a good example. There, public policy
was defined as that which is "right and just" and which "affects citizens of the State collectively." '2 1' This standard does not provide the
employer in Palmateer,or any other Illinois employer, with a useful
guide for measuring the point at which legal and protected conduct
turns tortious.
The third rationale for rejecting the public policy exception is
that for all of the problems it introduces into the law and workplace,
the added protection it offers employees is unnecessary. This is not to
say that wrongful discharges do not occur, or that the employee will
always secure adequate recovery. The point is that there are other,
more bridled legal theories which, when combined, offer the at-will
employee a reasonable degree of protection against abusive discharge. 21 2 InAlaska, at-will employees may secure a wrongful discharge recovery by one of three different routes. Either individually or
in combination with one another, these recovery routes are capable of
servicing the entire landscape of wrongful discharge fact patterns.
209. Id. at 301, 448 N.E.2d at 89-90, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36. See also Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1329-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on
the rationale in Murphy to deny causes of action in Florida for retaliatory discharge
based on public policy).
210. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981). See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
211. Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
212. The California Supreme Court has recently agreed. In declining to allow recovery of tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Justice Lucas proclaimed: "We believe that focus on available contract remedies
offers the most appropriate method of expanding available relief for wrongful terminations. The expansion of tort remedies in the employment context has potentially enormous consequences for the stability of the business community." Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 699, 765 P.2d 373, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 239 (1988).
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The first route is legislative. The United States Congress and the
Alaska Legislature have enacted laws which categorically prohibit an
employer from discharging an employee in certain situations or for
certain motivations. 21 3 Where the employer has violated one of these
laws, the employee is entitled to a remedy. Second, the employee may
recover on an implied contract theory. 2 14 This theory adequately protects recovery rights wherever the discharge is contrary to express or
implied assurances ofjob security. 215 Third, the Alaska employee may
also recover if the discharge has breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing2 16 said to exist in every Alaska employment
contract. 21 7 This theory by itself is broad enough to allow recovery for
any discharge which a jury finds was "unfair" or in "bad faith." The
connotative breadth of these key terms and the flexibility of the implied covenant theory provide ample protection of an employee's recovery rights in a wide range of discharges, including those which
218
violate public policy.
Together, these three recovery routes sufficiently service most
wrongful discharge scenarios, including those typically held out to justify the adoption of the public policy theory. Proponents of the theory
claim that public policy should provide a basis for recovery since such
pressure to violate the law is clearly harmful to society and unfair to
the employee. While this may be true, the public policy doctrine is not
necessary to ensure recovery. A discharge based on refusal to break
the law is inconsistent with the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and damages could easily be awarded on such grounds. 2 19
213. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
215. See Rutledge v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 727 P.2d 1050, 1056 (1986)
(recognizing implied contract theory but denying recovery on the facts); Eales v.
Tanana Valley Medical-Surgical Group, Inc., 663 P.2d 958, 959 (Alaska 1983).
216. See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
217. See Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983). See also supra note
141 and accompanying text.
218. While the Alaska Supreme Court has yet to recognize a special public policy
tort exception to at-will employment, it has acknowledged that discharges in violation
of public policy can constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). See
supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text. In fact, Luedtke can be read as an indication of the court's as yet unstated belief that public policy interests can be adequately
vindicated through contractual remedies. The court's reliance on the implied covenant is at least a seed of support for the proposition that a separate, tort-based public
policy theory is unnecessary. If, however, such an interpretation is erroneous and the
court does adopt a separate tort theory, Luedtke's expansive definition of public policy
will make it difficult to impose any limits at all on the amount of recovery.
219. See, e.g., Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1984).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that under Arkansas law "it is an
implied term of every contract of employment that neither party be required to do
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The rejoinder of the public policy advocates is that the best recovery competing theories can secure in any case will be some variation of
contract damages. Claims argued on the basis of public policy, however, allow the discharged employee to tap into the enormous reservoir
of tort liability. 220 Morever, since it is well settled that the purpose of
contract damages is to compensate rather than punish, 221 the public
policy theory is touted as the employee's only access to punitive
damages.
While it is true that the Alaska Supreme Court has grounded all
breach of implied covenant claims in contract, 222 the tortious nature of
the public policy theory does not justify its adoption. At-will employment is fundamentally a contractual relationship created by two consenting parties. The discharge of the employee by the employer puts
an end to the contractual relationship. If it is found that the contract
was wrongfully terminated, then the injured party may be entitled to
damages. The remedy, however, like the relationship, is rooted in contract law. To allow a tort recovery for wrongful discharge is to change
the character of the entire employment relationship. 223 It is still possible that one or both parties engaged in tortious conduct in their dealings with one another. The Alaska Supreme Court has stated that
where the employer's conduct rises to the level of a traditional independent tort, the employee may recover tort damages. 224 The public policy theory, therefore, is simply not necessary to compensate the
employee who, for example, is shown to have suffered extreme emotional distress as the result of an abusive discharge. Nor is the public
policy theory needed to punish the employer in such situations since
what the law forbids." Id. In addition to the breach of contract, however, the court
also recognized a possible claim in tort for breach of public policy. Id. While most
jurisdictions allow tort recoveries where the discharge is in response to a refusal to
violate the law, see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text, there is room for argument that the discharge is a breach of contract and liability on this ground alone is
sufficient. The state may, of course, bring criminal charges if the employer's conduct
has risen to that level.
220. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 694, 765 P.2d 373, 397,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 235 (1988) ("The most frequently cited reason for the move to
extend tort remedies in this context is the perception that traditional contract remedies are inadequate to compensate for certain breaches.").
221. Wein Air Alaska v. Bubbel, 723 P.2d 627, 631 (Alaska 1986).
222. ARCO Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988).
223. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840-41 (Wis. 1983)
(stating that contractual remedies are the most appropriate for public policy exception
wrongful discharges since the primary concern in these actions is to make the wronged
employee whole). Cf Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236
(recognizing that "[t]he employment relationship is fundamentally contractual," and
thus denying tort damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).
224. Akers, 753 P.2d at 1154.
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punitive damages would also be available. 225 The law of torts operates
in the background of every contractual undertaking. Alaska employment law has not changed this maxim. Where a wrongful discharge
involves tortious conduct, the public policy theory is superfluous.
Where no torts are involved, the public policy theory is a misguided
attempt to sever the employment relationship from its contractual
roots.
B.

A Limited Public Policy Exception

An alternative approach to the issue is to recognize the public
policy exception, but restrict its scope in such a way as to minimize the
226
attendant risks. This method has been adopted by many courts
which have found at least some value to the theory as a basis of employer liability, but which are nonetheless wary of distorting the employment relationship and chilling managerial discretion. Once again,
the primary motivation of the courts is to refrain from unwarranted
judicial legislation on issues which have such a significant effect on
private employment transactions. 227 Not surprisingly, therefore, these
states restrict employer liability to those situations in which the
wrongful discharge has violated a well-defined, legislatively declared
public policy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, for example, has defined the public policy exception very narrowly. In Brockmeyer v.
Dun & Bradstreet,22 8 that court ruled:
The public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory
provision .... We intend to recognize an existing limited public

policy exception ....Courts should proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations. No employer should be subject to
suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy
or because the public may have derived some benefit from
229
it.

If the Alaska Supreme Court recognizes the public policy exception at all, there is good reason to believe that it will do so only in this
limited form. In Walt, 230 Chief Justice Rabinowitz indicated that the
court would not recognize tort claims based on the violation of a stat232
23 1
ute unless so authorized by the statute itself. Similarly, in Akers,
225. Id.

226. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 36, 432 A.2d 464,
469 (1981); Glaz v. Ralston Purina Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 509 N.E.2d 297 (App.

Ct. 1987); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (all
denying recovery where public policy was not specific enough).
227. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
228. 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983).
229. Id. at 567, 335 N.W.2d at 840 (citation omitted).
230. 751 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1988).
231. The court stated that "[e]ven if [ALASKA

STAT.

§ ] 39.25.160(f) were applica-

ble here, the legislature has not evinced an intent to create an additional tort remedy
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the court refused to decide the public policy issue because "Akers
[did] not allege that his termination violated an explicit public policy."' 2 3 3 Since Akers was suing on the much more general proposition
that breaching the implied covenant of good faith was contrary to public policy, the court dismissed his claim outright. Relying on a similar
New York case, the court reasoned:
The trial court held that "[b]ad faith breach of employment contracts should ...

be deemed violative of state public policy." We

believe that this approach is unsound. Under this theory, any
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would come
under the public policy exception ...... "Allowing such an argument would shift the court's investigation from one of determining a
violation of public policy to one of determining the good faith of an
employer's
decision. The court will not proceed down such a
234
road.",

It is thus possible that any public policy exception the court may 23
have
5
in mind will be restricted to explicit legislative pronouncements.
The value of limiting the public policy exception is twofold.
First, it allows the public policy doctrine to serve a type of legislative
enforcement function that is ill suited to other theories. Take, for example, the employer who discharges his employee for refusing to violate the Alaska pollution control laws. Such a discharge certainly
for violation of this statute." 751 P.2d at 1351. Interestingly, the court has not exhibited such restraint where contract theories of wrongful discharge are concerned. In
Luedtke, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989), the court reasoned that a public policy violation could serve as a basis for finding a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. The court did not limit "public policy" to legislative declarations,
but instead embraced a very broad definition identical to that adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.
2d 124, 130, 421
N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981). Though only dicta, the language in Luedtke seems to suggest
that a discharge contrary to any public policy, as proclaimed by either the legislature
or the judiciary, may breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
which, in turn, will support an award of contract damages. Luedtke, 768 P.2d at
1130.
232. 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
233. Id. at 1153.
234. Id. at 1153 n. 1 (citing Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp.,
551 F. Supp. 544, 548-49 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
235. The court's recent decision in Luedtke, however, may make such a limited
public policy doctrine unlikely. In that case, the court adopted a very broad definition
of public policy which encompassed not only state statutes, but also the state constitution and Alaska judicial decisions. 768 P.2d at 1132-33. Significantly, the Luedtke
analysis was carefully confined to addressing the role that public policy plays in the
employer's contractual obligation to deal in good faith. Nevertheless, if a separate,
tort-based public policy doctrine is recognized, there is reason to believe that the
Luedtke definition will continue to apply. If this is, in fact, a foregone conclusion, the
crucial question is not the definition of public policy, but whether the court will recognize an action in tort for public policy violations by an employer. See supra note 218.
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contravenes the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Damages may be awarded on this theory, which presumably will compensate the employee for his loss. Assuming that no independent tort has
been committed, the employer will not be liable for punitive damages.
Moreover, if no pollution law was in fact violated, criminal prosecution may be unlikely. It may be of some value, therefore, to have a
legal theory which imposes added liability to deter future attempts to
violate the law. The public policy tort can thus serve the useful function of bridging the liability gap between compensatory damages and
criminal sanctions.
The second value to the limited approach is that it confines the
scope of the public policy theory to manageable proportions. Courts
would not be permitted to find that a discharge has offended some
general public interest and then use this finding to augment the employee's recovery. Nor are discharged employees seduced into filing
236
frivolous claims in hopes of cashing in on a broad tort theory.
Rather, liability for breaching public policy is triggered only where the
employer's conduct violates specific legislation. Limiting the public
policy exception not only reduces the likelihood that courts will legislate their own public policy but also keeps contract recoveries from
becoming tort windfalls.
C.

Legislative Intervention

A third approach to the public policy issue requires legislative
shaping of wrongful discharge law in Alaska. The most troubling
facet of the public policy theory is that its amorphous nature frustrates
employer attempts to predict which discharges are "safe" and which
discharges will end up in large tort judgments. Over time, individual
cases tend to incrementally loosen judicial standards. In turn, this
doctrinal relaxation can gradually transform what constitutes a breach
of public policy from a narrow class of discharges to a much broader
arena defined by general notions of "public interest." Moreover, even
if judicial doctrine does not waver, tort liability will continue to be
administered by unpredictable lay juries. Legislative attention to
wrongful discharge liability can lessen some of these litigation hazards
by (1) increasing the certainty of legal standards, (2) reducing the role
of the judicial process and (3) reducing frivolous suits by making access to recovery more difficult.
One legislative approach is simply to enact a statute that confines
wrongful discharge liability within reasonable boundaries. A statute
that defines what constitutes a discharge in violation of public policy
has the virtue of certainty. Employers have some reliable standard by
236. See supra note 102.
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which to identify where permissible discretion becomes wrongful discharge. Moreover, employees may determine with some certainty
whether they have a legitimate cause of action for being discharged
contrary to public policy. The increased certainty reduces both the
incentive to file tenuous claims and the risk in deciding whether to
commit the time and money to litigate. Finally, a combination of all
of these factors is likely to reduce wrongful discharge litigation by
making the employer's decision to discharge and the employee's decision to sue more informed. To this extent, judicial resources are allocated more efficiently.
The exact wording of such a statute is subject to debate. The
Montana Legislature has recently enacted the following:
A discharge is wrongful only if:
(1) it was in retaliation for the employee's refusal to violate
public policy or for reporting a violation of public policy;
(2) the discharge was not for good cause and the employee
had completed the employer's probationary period of employment;
or
(3) the employer violated
the express provisions of its own
237
written personnel policy.
The legislature specifically defined public policy as "a policy in effect
at the time of the discharge concerning the public health, safety, or
welfare established by constitutional provision, statute, or administrative rule."' 238 Significantly, the Montana Legislature also preempted
all common law remedies: "Except as otherwise provided in this part,
no claim for discharge may arise from tort or express or implied contract. ' 239 Thus, the Montana statute represents an attempt to define
237. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (1989). Section 39-2-905 of the Montana
Code defines available wrongful discharge remedies as follows:
(1) If an employer has committed a wrongful discharge, the employee
may be awarded lost wages and fringe benefits for a period not to exceed 4
years from the date of discharge, together with interest thereon. Interim
earnings, including amounts the employee could have earned with reasonable diligence, must be deducted from the amount awarded for lost wages.
(2) The employee may recover punitive damages otherwise allowed by
law if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the employer
engaged in actual fraud or actual malice in the discharge of the employee in
violation of [§ ] 39-2-904(l).
(3) There is no right under any legal theory to damages for wrongful
discharge under this part for pain and suffering, emotional distress, compensatory damages, or any other form of damages, except as provided for in
subsections (1) and (2).
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 39-2-905 (1989).

238. Id. § 39-2-903(7).
239. Id. § 39-2-913.
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the scope of wrongful discharge liability through representative decision-making rather than through a judicial sense of approximate
justice.
A legislative definition of wrongful discharge does not necessarily
end the problems of judicial treatment. The success of the legislative
efforts will depend upon the type of statute enacted. The Virgin Islands, for example, has also attempted to codify the scope of wrongful
discharge liability.240 Unlike Montana, the Virgin Islands statute lists
nine permissible reasons for discharging an employee and declares all
other discharges wrongful unless the employment contract explicitly
provides otherwise. 24' The statute specifically allows "any wrongfully
discharged employee ... [to] bring an action for compensatory and
punitive damages... against any employer who has violated [the statute]." ' 242 Unfortunately, the Virgin Islands statute curtails judicial discretion without making many improvements; employers are still
subject to tremendous liabililty for a universe of discharges defined
only in the negative. 243 Efforts by the Alaska Legislature to define
wrongful discharge liability should, like Montana, focus instead on reducing uncertainty in the ranks of management without suffocating atwill employment.
240. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (Supp. 1989).
241. Id. § 76. The statute provides as follows:
(a) Unless modified by contract, an employer may dismiss any employee:
(1) who engages in a business which conflicts with his duties to
his employer or renders him a rival of his employer;
(2) whose insolent or offensive conduct toward a customer of the
employer injures the employer's business;
(3) whose use of intoxicants or controlled substances interferes
with the proper discharge of his duties;
(4) who wilfully and intentionally disobeys reasonable and lawful
rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; ...
(5) who performs his work assignments in a negligent manner;
(6) whose continuous absences from his place of employment affect the interests of his employer;
(7) who is incompetent or inefficient, thereby impairing his usefulness to his employer;
(8) who is dishonest; or
(9) whose conduct is such that it leads to the refusal, reluctance
or inability of other employees to work with him.
(C) Any employee discharged for reasons other than those stated in subsection (a) of this section shall be considered to have been wrongfully
discharged.
242. Id. § 79.
243. Presumably, for example, an employer could be subject to punitive damages
for discharging an upper level employee who was generally competent but less ambitious or creative than originally thought. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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A second legislative approach is to permit arbitration to serve as
an alterative forum for the resolution of wrongful discharge disputes. 244 This proposition is considerably more controversial than enacting a wrongful discharge statute. The greatest opposition would
undoubtedly come from the plaintiff's bar, which would stand to lose
a considerable amount of business. Nevertheless, arbitration does offer both the employer and the employee some advantages over the current system.
Arbitration benefits the employee most significantly by providing
a forum to hear his or her claim at less cost and risk than is possible
with traditional litigation. By reducing these systemic impediments,
employees an better able to hold employers accountable for truly abusive discharges. More importantly, arbitration may prevent future
wrongful discharges, not by intimidating employers with large recoveries, but by fostering the development and enforcement of reasonable
employer policies governing at-will discharges. Professor Gould, the
245
leading proponent of arbitration in the at-will employment context,
has written:
Under an arbitration system, employee Joe Smith, who is fired by
IBM, Kodak, or any other nonunion employer for alleged deficiencies in performance, would have a right to confront his accusers at a
hearing. Moreover, unless Smith is alleged to have committed theft
or some other egregious misconduct, the company must warn him
about his failings and provide him with an opportunity to change
his ways. Generally, arbitrators will not uphold managements that
accuse an employee of sloppy workmanship, for instance, and then
subsequently rely upon other reasons, such as theft or drunkenness
on the job when it looks as though the employee will protest and the
workmanship argument will be difficult to prove. In essence,
arbi246
tration provides the employee a measure of due process.
Employers are given the benefit of the arbitrator's expertise in
labor matters and his reputation for impartiality. The risk that upper
level employees will recover simply because the reasons for the discharge are difficult to articulate247 is thus minimized. Moreover, an
244. See generally Gould, supra note 65.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 416. In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988), the California Supreme Court recognized the inadequacies
of current trends in wrongful discharge liability and relied extensively on Gould's
arguments to keep tort theories of recovery at a distance. The majority noted:
"Gould advocates exploring arbitration as an alternative, and his emphasis on the
sporadic effectiveness of the tort cause of action to remedy perceived inadequacies in
employee protection is important to our consideration of the effectiveness of the [tort]
remedy sought here." Id. at 696, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
247. See supra discussion at note 109 and accompanying text.
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arbitrator is also more likely to appreciate economic necessity arguments as justification for a discharge,2 48 which an employee of long
standing claims was unwarranted. Perhaps the penultimate benefit to
employers is that arbitration remedies are limited to back pay and reinstatement rather than the extensive relief available under modem
tort theories like the public policy exception. 2 49 Arbitration will make
it easier for employees to bring claims and, therefore, employers will
be called upon to defend more discharge decisions than under the
present litigation-based system. Nevertheless, the fact that both the
risk and amount of liability are considerably lower may in the long run
prove arbitration a preferable alternative.
A final legislative approach is to impose liability for breaches of
specific public policy, but deny any private right of action for such
breaches. The state, not the discharged employee, could investigate
the discharge and make the ultimate decision of whether or not to
bring suit. The effect of this approach is to separate the employee's
interest in compensation for wrongful discharge from the state's interest in deterring conduct contrary to public policy. Denying a private
right of action for breaches of public policy prevents the interest of
individual plaintiffs from bastardizing a public policy tort theory into
a tool for private recovery.
The idea of denying a private right of action stems from the theoretical underpinnings of the public policy doctrine itself. When an employee is wrongfully discharged, he or she suffers a loss. That loss
may have both monetary and non-monetary components for which
compensation may be awarded. However, the employee's personal
loss is made no greater by the fact that the discharge has also violated
some public policy. The harm of public policy violations is that they
undermine legal rules enacted for public security. The justification for
imposing liability on public policy grounds is to protect the community at large, not to vindicate the recovery rights of a discharged employee. Several courts have explicitly acknowledged this fact.2 50 In
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,251 the California Supreme Court
noted:
[A]n employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee
who refuses to commit a criminal act does not depend upon any
248. Gould, supra note 65, at 416.

249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052, 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo. 1985).
251. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
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express or implied "promises set forth in the [employment] contract" . . . but rather reflects a duty imposed by law upon all empublic policies
ployers in order to implement the 2fundamental
52
embodied in the state's penal statutes.
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,253 the California Supreme Court
reemphasized the focus of the public policy tort:
When such a termination occurs, the nature of the employee's relationship with the employer, whether at will or contractual, is essentially irrelevant. What is vindicated through the [public policy]
cause of action is not the terms or promises arising out of the particular employment relationship involved, but rather the public interest in not permitting employers to impose as a condition of
act in a manner conemployment a requirement that an 2employee
54
trary to fundamental public policy.
Preferring state action to private litigation, especially where a
public harm is involved, is far from a novel approach. In tort law, for
example, it is well settled that certain forms of public nuisance actions
may be brought only by the state. While the nuisance may have a
harmful effect on individuals, the wrong is inflicted upon the public in
general and, accordingly, private remedies are subordinated to state
action.2 55 Similarly, in the field of trusts and estates law, the traditional approach has been to deny standing to an individual beneficiary
seeking to enforce a charitable trust. Instead, breaches of charitable
trusts are generally actionable only at the discretion of the state attorney general.256 State prosecution of criminal violations provides yet
another example. The common thread running through these diverse
illustrations is that the responsibility for deciding whether to bring suit
has been shifted from the individual claiming to have suffered harm, to
the state on behalf of the public interest.
252. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (citations omitted).
253. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
254. Id. at 667 n.7, 765 P.2d at 377-78 n.7, 254 Cal. Rptr. 215-16 n.7. The Oregon
Supreme Court echoed these sentiments in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512
(1975) (en banc), stating that the effect of its holding was to create "a right in plaintiff
to recover compensatory damages because of the substantial 'societal interests' in having citizens serve on juries." Id. at 220, 536 P.2d at 516. The court emphasized that
"[i]t is only in those instances where the violation of societal interests is sufficiently
great and of a kind that sanctions would tend to prevent, that the use of punitive
damages is proper." Id., (citation omitted). See also Mallor, supra note 11, at 495.
255. Admittedly, the public nuisance analogy has its limitations. Public nuisance
law does permit individuals to bring private suits where it can be shown that the
private harm is distinguishable either in kind or degree from the public harm. W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 90, at 646-52 (5th ed. 1984). An employee wrong-

fully discharged in a manner contrary to public policy would invariably be able to
make such a showing.
256. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 156 (6th ed. 1987).
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Adopting a similar approach for discharges in violation of public
policy has several advantages. First, the state serves a natural screening function in investigating and evaluating the merits of each public
policy claim. Only those cases which have merit will be pursued,
thereby minimizing the costs of frivolous claims on the judicial system. Second, and more important, placing all public policy claims
within the purview of state discretion reinforces the distinction between the collective harm of public policy breaches and the private
harm of contractual breaches. Such an approach maintains the contractual essence of the employment relationship and thus shapes
wrongful discharge recoveries in strict accordance with the harm actually suffered by the plaintiff employee. Third, the fact that the employer has a separate liability to the state, or to the public, regardless
of what the employee has personally suffered, holds offending employers accountable. Liability for public policy breaches is thus not constrained by the financial limitations that suits against large
corporations often pose for individual litigants. 257 Finally, while public rights are vindicated, innocent employers are protected from having to fend off frivolous public policy tort claims every time an at-will
employee is discharged. The general advantage of this alternative,
therefore, is that it affords ample protection to both the public and to
innocent employers without impairing the legitimate recovery rights of
the employee.
On a practical level, persuasive arguments can be made that the
administrative costs of establishing and maintaining such investigative
machinery will simply shift the burden of frivolous claims from the
judicial to the executive branch. Moreover, it may be urged that the
cost to the public of funding such a system will far outweigh any of the
foregoing benefits. While these arguments tend to overestimate the
costs of implementing such a system (the infrastructure for which is
already in place), they do have merit. Nevertheless, at least on a theoretical level, the idea of functionally distinguishing the remedies for a
breach of contract and a violation of public policy underscores a
theme of this note. A wrongfully discharged employee has suffered
harm because of a breach of contract. For that breach, the employer
must be made to pay contract damages which, the law presumes, will
make the employee whole. If the public policy exception is recognized, it should at least be acknowledged that the employee is being
afforded a windfall for the benefit of the public good. Since such windfalls are likely to entice undeserving plaintiffs and increase litigation
costs, it is not fanciful to suggest that the state have some role in
screening public policy claims.
257. Professor Gould estimates that bringing a wrongful discharge suit costs the
average employee over $10,000 just to get to trial. Gould, supra note 65, at 413.
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CONCLUSION

Despite the emerging trend in other jurisdictions to limit the
American rule, employment at will in Alaska has remained largely
intact. Legislative modifications of the rule, if at times sporadic, have
nevertheless been well-reasoned efforts to protect basic employee
rights from abuse. The judicial treatment of employment at will has
been not only cautious, but also, more importantly, philosophically
sound. The Alaska Supreme Court has made clear efforts to respect
the contractual nature of the employment relationship. The modifications the court has imposed, the implied contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, are rooted in basic contract law
and are ultimately designed to enforce contractual expectations. Consistent with this approach, the role of tort law has been confined to
liability for the commission of traditional and independent torts. The
court will not look favorably upon attempts to translate contractual
wrongs into tort recoveries.
Together, the Walt and Akers cases have introduced the prospect
of tort liability for wrongful discharges that violate public policy. To
accept the public policy doctrine as a significant limitation on at-will
employment would mark an abrupt change in direction for Alaska employment law. While it is possible that the court may permit a very
limited exception, it is unlikely that public policy will be allowed to tip
the contractual balance between employers and employees.
Thomas P. Owens III

